Alatistan

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Republic of Alatistan
Alatıstan Cumhuriyeti
Anthem: Alat milleti!
O, Alat nation!
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File:Hunawiyah Map 2.png
CapitalKışla
Largest cityCemaller
Official languagesAlat
Ethnic groups
Alati
Azeri
Pasdani
Religion
Sunni Islam
Demonym(s)Alati
GovernmentUnitary Ifran Collectivist military dictatorship
• President
Mustafa Öztrak
Kazım Süleyman
LegislatureMajlis
Establishment
• Independence
1914
• Ifranist Coup
1964
Population
• 2015 census
18,073,636
GDP (PPP)estimate
• Total
$154,204 million
• Per capita
$8,532
GDP (nominal)estimate
• Total
$85,018 million
• Per capita
$4,704
Gini (2015)29.8
low
HDI (2015)0.698
medium
CurrencyKuruş
Date formatmm-dd-yyyy
Driving sideleft
Calling code+47
Internet TLD.al

Alatistan (Alati: Alatıstan) officially known as the Republic of Alatistan (Alati: Alatıstan Cumhuriyeti) is a nation in Nautasia bordering Nautarya to the west and Mazaristan to the south. A military dictatorship, the country has a population of 18,073,636 with its capital city being Kışla and largest city being Cemaller.

Alati civilisation developed over centuries with the spread of Islam particularly helping unify the Alati people. Between 1346 until its demise in 1753 the Quam Sultanate ruled over much of modern day Alatistan and helped institute a coherent Alati culture across its territory with Alatisation being undertaken. After the fall of the Quam Sultanate the territory split between various tribes and petty kingdoms until it was annexed into the Erkemen Empire during the 1700's. It continued to be part of the empire until 1914 when a nationalist revolution proclaimed an independent Alatistan which became a Sultanate under Djemal Aghabey. The Sultanate discriminated against the Pasdan people explicitly promoting Alati's in public, political and economic life. The discovery of oil in 1915 led to the economy to undergo an economic boom but political instability led to a popular revolution in 1950. The new democratic regime was even more unstable resulting in a military coup in 1964 by Ifranic Collectivist officers backed by Khazestan-Pasdan.

Alatistan is an impoverished and politically isolated country. Oil and natural gas reserves remain the main sectors of the state run command economy. A majority of the population are Alati with Azeri and Pasdani minorities.

Etymology

The name "Kaona" (ข้าวนา; Kâao Na) roughly translates to "rice field" in Kaonese. The name likely refers to the territory around the former capital of Phuko which is known as prime rice growing lands, having being referred to as such for centuries by western geographers. Prior to Luziycan colonisation, the region had no common name with various kingdoms and dynasties being named after their capital cities. When Luziyca first colonised Kaona the nations named was spelt by westerners as "Caona" a spelling dating back centuries. During the 1930's Kaonese nationalists used Kaona in place of the "imperialist" Caona, and as such declared the Kaonese People's Union in 1951. Caona is still used to denote the rump Caonese dominion on Phikam, with Caona being used by overseas Kaonese people who refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the communist regime. Since 1951, the government in Daeng Meuang has insisted on the use of the name Kaona in its diplomatic relations.

History

Prehistory

Archaeological evidence suggests that human life has resided in what now consists of Kaona since the Palaeolithic age, with fossils and human teeth being discovered in the Ban Thung Si (บ้านทุ่งศรี) caves in the Nasuan province. It is theorised that the first people of Kaona came from Namor, and were Monic, and were initially hunter-gatherer people. During the Iron age Kaonese tribes began to coalesce into farming societies centred around rice paddies as well as raise poultry and rice.

Ruins of the Chaoya Temple, built around 100 CE
During the iron age the first Kaonese states began to form, mainly in the modern day northeastern provinces of Boripat Pakneua and Khao Noi. These kingdoms did not yet develop a writing system, and as such much of their history has either been unearthed through archaeological remains and contact with Namorese traders. According to Namorese sources, these states took the form of farming based tribal confederations, with each owing loyalty to figurehead monarchs and shamans. Many of these states were populated by diverse groups of people who have been collectively grouped by historians as "Munchi Kaonese", as many resided near the Munchi River in northeast Kaona.

Around 100 CE the Pankong (ปั้นคง) Kingdom was formed in modern day west Kaona. The Pankong Kingdom saw the spread of what would become the Kaonese language which began to formulated into a script around 150 CE, which was adapted from the Phnom Empire. Whilst the Pankong Kingdom initially began as tribal confederation, it eventually centralised under a seemingly complex system of warlords and shamans supporting the king. Most significantly, the Pankong kingdom saw Buddhism start to enter Kaonese society, although it would take centuries before the religion became dominant in Kaona. The Pankong Kingdom collapsed around 300 CE, starting a series of civil wars within the region that would continue for another half a millennia, with various kingdoms within the region attempting to and failing to unite the warring factions.

Caliphate

King Ramathibodi (Rama I), founder of the Yutkong Kingdom
Around 800 CE the Anachak Empire (จักรวรรดิอังกฤษ; អាណាចក្រមហា) was able to establish a hegemony over the Kaonese region through either taking over or vassalising smaller states. The Anakpri spread their languages and Buddhist practices. The Anachak Empire brought over new farming, architectural, technological and administrative innovations, but downplayed the development of Buddhism within Kaona instead promoting the cult of the god-kings (devarāja). The Anachak Empire maintained social stability by allowing the speaking and inscription of the Kaonese language, as well as promoting ethnic Kaonese into the ruling bureaucracy. although ethnic Anakpri's would overwhelmingly dominate state institutions which were based on a hereditary rather then meritocratic system of social mobility.

The Anachak Empire went into a state of decline during the 1300's due to social stagnation, bankruptcy and frequent rebellions. By the 1340's the empire Anachak near total collapse, with its only real control being exercised over the Phikam islands thanks to rebellions directed against the ruling elite over their inability to provide patronage to vassal kingdoms - in turn the empire was further paralysed as it used its tax revenues to fight costly rebellions. By the late 1340's the former vassal kingdom of Yutkong centred around the city of Chonrat had become the most dominant, with its King Ramathibodi, commonly known as Rama I, successfully absorbing many of the vassal kingdoms. By 1350, the Yutkong Kingdom (หยุดของอาณาจักร) had established itself as the new imperial power within the region.

Qumar Sultanate

During the unification of the vassal kingdoms, Rama I combined the belief of devarāja with a patronage of Theravada Buddhism, thus melding Buddhist monks into the new state bureaucracy, institutionalising Theravada as the state religion of the kingdom. Land held by Buddhist monks was exempted from taxes, whilst feudal landlords were largely autonomous within the kingdom. Rama's patronage of Buddhism led to the fast expansion of the faith and further led to the decline of the former Anachak elite. The Buddhist monks used Kaonese script over the Anachak script, and promoted the use of the Kaonese language which led to the erosion of Anachak influence. Rama also instituted a meritocratic system of promotion within the armed forces, with military officers rising through the ranks based on their skill and subsequently being rewarded with lands and titles.

Temple of the Auspicious Buddha, built during the Ratchakao period
Rama I's rule came to an end in 1367, when he was supposedly killed by his son Chatichai, who subsequently ascended to the throne ruling until 1386. Chatichai expanded Theravada Buddhist influence at the expense of regional warlords, which resulted in conflict between the central government and the regional warlords that ended in the crushing of said warlords. This in turn enabled the monarchy and Buddhist temples to create a centralised state with the Yutkong monarchy supported by the Buddhist monks exerting absolute control over the kingdom, resulting in the spread of a coherent Kaonese culture across the region. Between the 1400 to the mid 1600's the Yutkong Kingdom continued to expand and develop culturally and economically. This was considered to be the golden age of Kaona as it became one of the most important trade routes for Borea, nicknamed the "gateway to the orient" as it traded spices, rice, textiles, gold and silver primarily with Namor and Ainin. As the kingdom expanded it became more ethnically and religiously diverse, but like the Anachak before them the Yutkong elites aimed to integrate these ethnic groups into Kaonese society - however unlike the Anachak all power was centralised in the hands of ethnic Kaonese, leading to the assimilation of ethnic groups into a singular Kaonese identity.

During the late 1600's the Yutkong Kingdom began to decline. During the 1600's the meritocratic system of social mobility created by Rama I had morphed into a hereditary one, leading to social stagnation and subsequently unrest. This weakened political and military institutions with the Yutkong kingdom. The kingdom attempted to offset growing social unrest by continuing territorial expansion, but this did little was most new land was given to Buddhist monks, exempting the land and its produce from being taxed under the patronage system towards Buddhists. Unable to raise significant tax revenues whilst continuing expansionist policies the kingdom became effectively bankrupt, leading to the landlords and Buddhists who relied on state patronage to fuel social unrest. This unrest manifested in the mid 1700's which saw the Yutkong dynasty collapse.

Main article: Ratchakao Kingdom
File:Flag of the Ratchakao Kingdom.png
Flag of the Ratchakao Kingdom, adopted in 1838
After the collapse of the Yutkong Kingdom, the Ratchakao dynasty centred in the city of Phuko creating the Ratchakao Kingdom (รัฐจะเข้าอาณาจักร) led by King Klao Yu around 1760. The new kingdom instituted a similar patronage of Buddhist monks whilst enforcing a new legal code and judicial system as well as absorbing and reforming much of the former Yutkong state bureaucracy. The collapse of Yutkong had as had occurred after the fall of the Anachak Empire had result in the rise of several vassal states, prompting the Ratchakao Kingdom to lead a series of military campaigns designed to unite the regional kingdoms into a single Kaonese state. The process of unification ended in 1796, after which the Ratchakao Kingdom began to centralise its state functions and modernise. The army was reorganised and the state adopt more permanent institutions as nationalist concepts were starting to develop.
The Royal Ratchakao Guard entering Thammachot after it was absorbed into Kaona in 1851
Under King Plaek II (1832-66) the Ratchakao government launched several important reforms, known as the Plaek reforms. Western forms of political organisation were implemented such as an appointed National Assembly (รัฐสภา) which oversaw legislative, ministerial and judicial matters as well as a drive to phase out the system of slavery. In 1855 conscription was introduced with the intention to centralise state power into the hands of the monarchy. Educational and legal reforms were enacted, Western styles of dress encouraged, a national census was commissioned and undertook in 1867 and the first universities created. State owned factories were created to create more arms and materials to starve off foreign invasions as well as limit the power of landlords and a new national flag and anthem were created. Coinage was also introduced leading to a more stable economy and an organised tax system, increasing state reveues. Despite these reforms the monarchy under Plaek was unable to implement planned land reform, which generated a backlash by feudal landlords. The state was still beholden to the interests of feudal landlords and Buddhist monks, which stifled further development and led to much of the reforms to be implemented in a patch work manner. Whilst this resulted in social and political stability between the monarchy, aristocracy and Buddhist monks it fostered the same socio-economic stagnation that had occurred under the Yutkong Kingdom. Much of the reforms were only felt within the area around Phuko, with outlying regions dominated by feudal landlords stalling on the implementation of the reforms.

During this period Kaona became increasingly absorbed in the sphere of Luziycan influence. Luziycan influence begun when Swedish settlers from Gulstad began frequent trade with Kaona in the 1700's, gaining a more permanent foothold after the collapse of the Yutkong Kingdom after supporting the Ratchakao Kingdom in their war to unify Kaona. During the 1800's Apostolic Catholic missionaries started to travel to Kaona, creating churches and schools which were tolerated by the Kaonese monarchy - Ratchakao elites saw the creation of religious schools as a way to modernise the Kaonese state. In 1862 the Kaonese government allowed Luziyca to construct the Oriental Railway, which ran through Kaona and was the first railway within Kaona. Owned the the Oriental Railway Company, a Luziycan semi-stated owned company, the Oriental Railway encouraged the settlement of Luziycans to Kaona. Kaona signed several unequal treaties with Luziyca that protected Luzyican citizens within Kaona in exchange for Luziycan investment in Kaona - however much of this investment was geared towards Luziycan interests, who took over the economic functions of the Kaonese state whilst being granted concessions in the form of leased territory in . The death of King Plaek in 1866 resulted in Luziyca to increasingly interfere into Kaonese internal affairs, with Kaona beginning to be transformed into a vassal state of Luziyca.

King Rama IX transferring sovereignty from the Ratchakao government to Luziyca in 1885

During the 1860's-80's Luziycan Christian missionaries travelled in greater numbers to Kaona, converting more Kaonese people from Buddhism to Apostolic Catholicism. Whilist welcomed by some Kaonese reformists and liberals who saw good relations with Luziyca as key to Kaonese modernisation, this led to the decline of Buddhist influence in the kingdom, leading Buddhist monks to put pressure onto the royal government to abolish the privileges of Christian missionaries and to limit Christian influence in Kaona. As the Ratchakao Kingdom was dependent on the tax revenues raised on land owned by Buddhist monks in 1881 the King of Kaona Rama IX ordered for all Luziycan Christian missionaries to leave mainland Kaona to either the leased territories or Luziyca. The Christian Luziycan government of Aldobrando Montano declared war on the Ratchakao Kingdom, contending that the expulsion of Christian missionaries violated several treaties between the Luziycan and Ratchakao governments, starting the Kaonese-Luziycan War which lasted from 1881 to 1887. The Kaonese Royal Army was woefully unequipped to deal with the larger, better trained and more modernised Luziycan Armed Forces. The Ratchakao Kingdom whilst having attempted to centralise the functions of the state was only partially successfully, with many parts of the kingdom being de facto fiefdoms and vassals of landlords and Buddhist monks, meaning resistance to the Luziycan invasion was sporadic. In June 1885 the capital of the Ratchakao Kingdom, Phuko, fell to Luziycan forces with Rama IX being forced to abdicate and sign the Saphung Declaration, which transferred the functions of the Kaonese state to Luziyca. Nevertheless, it would take until 1887 that Luziyca conquered the entirety of Kaona.

Under Luziycan rule Kaonese society was dramatically restructured as Buddhism was replaced with Christianity as the state religion which diminished the power of the Buddhist monks. Land was redistributed from native feudal lords to the Luziycan colonial government, who subsequently sold it to Luziycan businessmen who invested heavily in Kaona due to its natural resources and cheap labour force. The Kaonese army was disbanded with many of its members being transferred into the newly created Luziycan-Caonese Regiments, ensuring Luziycan control over Kaona. The colonial government was governed by an Executive Council headed by a governor-general, appointed by the Luziycan President which in turn appointed the governors of the provinces of the colony. During Luziycan rule education passed from Buddhist monks to Christian missionaries, who set up several religious schools to help convert Kaonese children to Christianity.

Kaona in 1902
Luziyca developed a plantation economy based around rice, rubber and tea alongside fishing, with the focus being on resource extraction. The Oriental Railway Company, the most powerful business in the Caonese Colony, established a country-wide rail system within the colony and expanding their interests into the mining and agricultural sectors of the economy to the extent that the Oriental Railway Company was described as being a "state within a state". The resource extraction resulted in produce previously designed to satisfy domestic demands to be instead transferred to Luziyca, resulting especially in the case of food for food shortages and a fall in the standard of living to occur.

The Caonese colony remained politically, socially and economically stable from the 1890's-1930's, with the expansion of infrastructure, literacy and Christianity changing Kaonese society whilst greater numbers of Luziycans settled to Kaona, some of whom entered interracial marriages with Kaonese citizens. Under Luziycan rule all Kaonese men were requiered to every year contribute unpaid labour for a month either to the Luziycan colonial government or more commonly the Oriental Railway Company, unless they converted to Christianity.

In 1916, the Thammachot Rebellion saw a group of rice farmers and independence activists in the Thammachot province to murder their Luziycan plantation owners and form an autonomous state within the colony, known as the Thammachot Commune. The commune existed for six months before being crushed by Luziycan forces, but during that time emboldened Kaonese nationalism with the Caonese government-in-exile being formed in 1916 by former Prince Vejjajiva. Resistance to Luziycan rule was minimal following the Thammachot Rebellion, but in the intellectual sphere Kaonese nationalism began to take root whilst in Kaonese expat communities, especially in Luziyca, agitation for greater autonomy for Kaona increased. During the 1940's there was an increase amongst overseas Kaonese nationalists in communist ideals, particularly relating to anti-imperialism thanks to a large number of Kaonese nationalists beinf educated at the International Socialist University in Staalstaat, Austrosia.

Erkemen Rule

In 1919 the Caona Act was passed by the Luziycan Congress which transformed the Kaona into the Dominion of Caona with an elected House of Commons and an executive government led by a Prime Minister. In the first elections in which only ethnic Luziycans could vote the Christian Unionist Party led by Antonin Lazarevic won a landslide majority. The CUP created a quasi-theocratic state that consolidated discriminatory laws towards Kaonese people and fully implemnting a system of racial segregation and confirmed the status of ethnic Luziycans as a dominant minority. Waves of oppression and racial violence followed, which saw the ILK increase in size. In 1930, the Stanislav Hamacek government passed the Combination Acts which banned native Kaonese people from politically organising, leading to the 1930 Phuko massacre which saw over 100 Kaonese people gunned down by the CUP government. Following the massacre the Anti-Imperialist Communist Front was formed with the intention of creating an independent Kaonese state. The AICF was dominated by communists and socialists, and following the massacre established a foothold in central Kaona began to agitate against the government. Under its First Secretary, Phayom Kongsom the AICF began turning to increasingly violent means in its protest movements. Kongsom theorised that by waging a guerrilla people's war based on the backbone of the peasantry Kaona would be able to achieve independence from Luziyca within a decade. The AICF created the Peasants and Workers' Army of Kaona (PWA) which were able to launch civil resistance, protests and riots by capitalising on the frustration felt by many Kaonese about the racist policies of the CUP governments as well longstanding grievances against Luziycan missionaries and landowners by Buddhists and the peasantry.

File:Najib.jpg
Khaled al-Sarraj, founder of the Kaonese People's Union, addressing the Supreme People's Assembly in 1963

The early 1930's saw conflict between the AICF and the colonial government increase, starting the Kaonese Revolutionary War as communist forces began to directly engage Luziycan forces. Between 1930-32 AICF forces expanded rapidly in Kaona, utilising a network of peasant supporters to spread their influence within the Caonese colony, especially in the northwest. In 1932 as the AICF controlled a sizeable territory in northwest Kaona, promoting Kongsom on the 23rd September to declare the creation of the Kaonese People's Union with himself as President in the city of Daeng Meuang, which was declared the capital. With the declaration of the People's Union fighting between communist and colonial forces escalated and intensified as pressure was mounted within the Caonese colony for internal reform.

In 1936 the Phuko Riots occured that saw hundreds of Kaonese Buddhist nationalists protest against Luziycan rule and the lack of representative democracy, the CUP government approached Luziyca with the intention of declaring an independent republic to quell the growing Kaonese nationalism. However, Luziycan president Daniel Varanken declared that there would be "no independence without majority rule", challenging the racist policies of the CUP. The CUP refused to repeal their policies, fearing the loss of the status of ethnic Luziycans and believing majority rule would lead to communism. This intensified ethnic tensions between the majority Caonese and minority Luziycan populations, and in 1938 when AICF forces overran the city of Kaimukta with the help of local peasants angry at the CNP government the Luziycan CIA and Luziycan-Caonese Regiment launched a coup d'état against the CUP government in 1938, replacing him with military general Sermkhun Lamsam who created the Peace Council that increased repression but gave ethnic equality to Kaonese people, increasing internal support for the new government. Despite this the AICF achieved more military success and with domestic criticism increasing in Luziyca itself in 1949 the Kittitak Peace Conference saw the AICF and dominion government to put in place an agreement that would result in a national unity government within five years that would oversee elections for a constituent assembly which would enable for Kaona to achieve independence from Luziyca. The military government was replaced with Chumpol Kulapongvanich who held elections in 1949 which were conducted under universal suffrage with the AICF agreeing to take part. The elections saw the AICF gain a plurality of seats, but systematic vote rigging, ballot stuffing and intimidation at polling stations denied them a majority as the National Party agreed to form a coalition government with the CUP which immediately banned the AICF. This reignited conflict as the AICF Central Committee rejected the terms of the Kittitak restarting the war. Kulapongvanich in 1950 banned all parties but the National Party.

Kulapongvanich escalated the war against the AICF whilst tightening control in non-communist held areas, declaring martial law in 1950. Those suspected of communism were arrested, imprisoned and often tortured or executed. The press was muzzled and freedoms curtailed. Meanwhile in communist held areas similar moves were made to create a one-party socialist state whilst land reform was carried out, with Luziycan landlords and Christians often persecuted or killed by the communist government. The Luziycan government also deployed more troops and military advisers to embolden the Caonese-Luziycan Regiment, which in turn led to Kaona to request to Alemannia and Austrosia to send its own advisers to aid the AICF and PWA.

The Quiet Revolution in Luziyca saw increased scepticism and criticism in Luziyca regarding the war especially as Luziyca began to use chemical weapons against Kaonese forces. With the war becoming increasingly unpopular in Luziyca and the AICF by 1954 controlling over half the country the Luziycan government began withdrawing its own troops with the exception of the Caonese-Luziycan Regiment. It still however attempted to destroy communist forces with bombings and directly fighting communist forces. In 1954 Kulapongvanich was overthrown by Sarathoon Patalung who created another military government, but by this time Luziycan control only extended across the modern day provinces of Changnar, Nasuan and Chonrat Phaonam. In November 1956 the communist forces launched the Battle of Phuko with the city falling six months later, prompting the Luziycan government to begin an evacuation of Luziycan and Caonese "loyalist" civilians in the Caonese dominion. In September 1957 the Phuko Ceasefire was declared as the AICF took control over the entirety of mainland Kaona, with the Caonese dominion being reduced to the Phikamese islands.

Emirate

Independence

The Khordad Revolution of 1914 brought chaos to the province of Alat in the Sarazid Empire. With republican and nationalist sentiment running high a provisional government of the Alat Republic was declared in Cemaller with Mehmet Çetinkaya inaugurated as president. The new republic however was quickly overthrown by General Djemal Aghabey's 17th Army with Aghabey declaring himself Sultan of the Sultanate of Alatistan. Aghabey soon declared a state of martial law and clamped down on political dissent, stabilising his regime in the short term. The 17th Army was reconfigured into the armed forces of Alatistan which was successfully able to repel Pasdani forces in 1915 during the Battle of Jabal Pass that attempted to retake the province. The success of Alati forces in maintaining their independence led to several countries including Luziyca, Ainin, Tuthina and Xiaodong to formally recognise the Sultanate.

The new regime was recognised in 1916 by Hüseyin Irmak's cabinet in Khazestan-Pasdan after pressure from abroad. Initially the new state was extremely poor having little industry and few natural resources. This changed in 1915 when Xiaodongese Petroleum and Gas discovered oil, creating the Eastern Petroleum Company (EPC) of whom most of the shares were concentrated in the hands of the Xiaodongese government. The discovery of oil as well as increasing international recognition meant that Aghabey was able to launch a programme of modernisation with the Xiyong Emperor as his model. These reforms included a large infrastructure programme, the creation of a Western-style banking and financial system, rationalising the state bureaucracy and most controversially a programme of "Alatisation" which sough to remove Pasdani cultural influences and promote an "authentic" Alati culture. This included using the Latin script, banning the Pasdani language and promoting Alati cultural traditions.

The collapse of Aghabey's primary benefactor Xiaodong during the 1930's led to the Sultan to enter a détente with the new Khazi-Pasdani government led by Asad Hossein Shahrestani whilst overseeing the transfer of the EPC from the Xiaodongese government to a consortium of foreign governments. This détente led to a Treaty of Mutual Understanding which saw Aghabey transfer several border provinces over to Khazestan-Pasdan and partial access to oil rights.

Aghabey's rule was repressive and unpopular with liberals, socialists, the clergy and nationalists opposed to what were seen as overly pro-western policies that sought to enrich Aghabey and the ruling clique. In 1950 after jailing student agitators at the University of Cemaller large popular demonstrations were held across the country demanding the end to Aghabey's rule. Seeing his grip on power was weak the military launched a coup d'état against the Sultan, exiling him from the country and announcing the creation of a republic. Elections were held in 1951 which saw a coalition of republican parties take power.

The new republic was based around a presidential system which soon encouraged divisions between the separately elected presidency and legislature. Although the economy recorded positive growth during this period political instability became common with neither of the first two republican presidents completing their terms. The third president, Ahmet Yücel, forged a coalition of liberals, conservative clerics and reformist social democrats to complete his four year term in 1960 as well as implement liberal reforms in the economy and oversee a broadly pro-western foreign policy. However by the beginning of the 1960's discontent within the military was high whilst political assassinations and violence became common with Ifranic Collectivists, socialists and nationalists often clashing in the streets.

The then-capital Cemaller in 1976.

In 1964 Yücel ran for a third presidential term violating the constitutions two term limit. This led to a military coup d'état backed by Khazestan-Pasdan with General Ömar Yılmaz Erbakan becoming Chairman of the newly formed Council for Peace and Order (CPO) with Adnan Aydın, Hıfzı Şahin and İsmet Kavranoğlu. The new regime clamped down on political dissent especially nationalist and liberal agitators, openly courting clerics and socialists disillusioned with their lack of success.

The new government was divided internally between nationalists, clericalists and Irfanic Collectivists. Initially deferring to the nationalists led by Aydın and Kavranoğlu Erbakan continued secularising reforms and most importantly nationalised oil fields in 1965. The nationalisation of oil fields led to international condemnation leading Erbakan to draw closer to Khazestan-Pasdan purging Aydın as vice-chairman of the CPO in 1967 and drawing more explicit support from Ifranic Collectivists. A political party, the Union for National Development, was founded under the leadership of Hıfzı Şahin which in 1967 drafted the Karabekir Memorandum which envisioned that by 1977 there would be "political, economic and social" integration into a Nautasian Union with Khazestan-Pasdan. Popular support for the regime grew in these years as an economic boom from oil profits led to the regime to invest in improving infrastructure, education and healthcare. Progressive secular reforms regarding women's rights were also pursued as was land reform in 1970.

Erbakan died in 1970 being replaced by Hıfzı Şahin. Şahin backed a form of integration into Khazestan-Pasdan, aiming to create a union of states which Alatistan would play an equal part in. However negotiations during the early 1970's were fraught with concerns from Alati military powerbrokers of unification meaning a de facto annexation by Khazestan-Pasdan. With support for integration so low within the regime Şahin instead began calling for pan-Nautasian confederation under Ifranic Collectivist principles, but lost support from his own Ifranic Collectivist faction leading to Şahin to court the support of his former rival, İsmet Kavranoğlu.

The 1974-1979 war between Khazestan-Pasdan and the SCCR resulted in Alatistan in 1975 to join the war in support of Khazestan-Pasdan with the intention of annexing territory. This goal was not achieved with Alatistan becoming militarily dependent on Khazestan-Pasdan during the war due to the weak state of the Alati Republican Army. This state of affairs coupled with declining support within the government meant Şahin's power began to fade with increasing power coming into the hands of Lieutenant General and now vice-chair of the CPO Kavranoğlu. In 1977 Şahin was forced to resign with Kavranoğlu already de facto leader being inaugurated as chairman of the CPO.

President İsmet Kavranoğlu oversaw a policy of nationalism that sought to distance Alatistan from the UNIR

Following the conclusion of the Khazestan-Pasdan-SCCR war tensions between the newly formed Union of Nautasian Irfanic Republics and Alatistan increased. Javad Jahandar's neoliberal economic reforms led Kavranoğlu to accuse the UNIR of ideological deviance from Ifranic Collectivist ideals giving the Alatistani government the ideological capability to repudiate the Karabekir Memorandum, precipitating the Alati-UNIR Split. Without Alatistan's major benefactor, Kavranoğlu began to pursue a policy of isolationism, closing the country's borders and implementing a policy of economic autarky. The Ayvaini Declaration in 1982 proclaimed Alatistan to be a "neutral, free and independent state" and adhering to the "principles of authentic Ifranic Collectivism in the tradition of Asad Hossein Shahrestani."

Under Kavranoğlu there was a general trend towards promoting Alati nationalism. Alati cultural activities which had been repressed by Erbakan and Şahin for their "anti-Nautasian tendencies" were revived whilst cultural homogeneity was heavily advocated with languages such as Pasdani, legalised in 1955, were once again banned similar to the policies of Sultan Aghabey. Kavranoğlu also promoted a policy of clericalism, integrating the clergy into governance. Military courts which had controlled the judiciary since 1964 were replaced by religious courts. The head cleric of Alatistan was afforded the title "Chief Judicator" which soon became a powerful position controlling the judiciary, the appointment of key state officials and providing ideological guidance for the regime. Clerics quickly began to legitimise a burgeoning cult of personality surrounding Kavranoğlu who was presented as father of the nation.

Kavranoğlu also increased measures considered repressive within the political sphere, using the regime's secret police the APB (Askeri Polis Birliği; Military Police Corps) to suppress dissent sending prisoners to the notorious Detention Centre 2/5b. Infamous stories of tortures and mass killings led to Alatistan to become a pariah state internationally albeit oil trade continued to be conducted which maintained the regime's generous welfare programmes. Between 1982 to 1990 the government moved the capital to a planned city, Kışla, intended to be a monument to Ifranic Collectivism.

Despite economic stagnation during the 1980's and 1990's the regime largely held power due to a mixture of repression, ideological hegemony, welfare programmes and the steady opening up of the state-backed Union for National Development to act less as a single party but more as a mass-based organisation that would channel citizen discontent into constructive policy formulations. Nevertheless, discontent remained - in 1992 the government conducted what foreign analysts described as an ethnic cleansing of Pasdani people in the border provinces with the UNIR in what became later known as the Yağbaşlar Operation.

In 2004 Kavranoğlu died being replaced by his protégé Mustafa Öztrak becoming president. Purging internal opponents led by Kavranoğlu's brother Mücahit in 2006 Öztrak's presidency saw a gradual shift away from the policies of his predecessor opening up Alatistan to foreign investors, privatising state-owned enterprises, scaling back the programme of Alatisation and pursuing a foreign policy of "reconciliation and trust building" with Alatistan's neighbours. This noticeably under the influence of Chief Judicator Kazım Süleyman took the form of repairing relations with the UNIR with Öztrak reinstating the Karabekir Memorandum as the "strategic goal" of the Alati state and opening up political, military and economic ties with the UNIR. Under Öztrak there has been an increasing reliance on policies pertaining to the marketisation of the economy but maintaining a repressive security state based on the UNIR model.

Since 2014 religious extremist and left-wing militant groups on the Mazari border have become a long-running security issue facing the Alati government. This has resulted in Öztrak to rely more on the UNIR for military assistance and since 2016 the International Forum for Developing States for economic assistance. This has led to increasing concerns that Alatistan is turning into a satellite state of the UNIR.

Government and Politics

Jabar is defined in its constitution as a unitary constitutional monarchy wherein sovereignty lies in both the people of Jabar and the teachings of God as laid out in the Qu'ran. The Sultan of Jabar acts as the head of state and government leading a cabinet of ministers responsible to the Majlis, the elected legislature of Jabar. In practice however Jabar is a one-party state under a military dictatorship with the Council of Peace and Order and its Chairman holding real power within the nation serving co-currently as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence. The Council of Peace and Order acts through the Arab Islamic National Party which espouses pan-Arabism and political Islamism.

The official head of state is the Sultan (سلطان‎). The Sultan has officially wide ranging executive powers but since 1968 has been stripped of the position of commander-in-chief and is officially appointed by the Council of Peace and Order, rendering the position to be in real terms ceremonial. Real power lies within the Council of Peace and Order (مجلس السلام والنظام) a body that serves as the de facto single-party, with its 12 member central committee being the most important political body in the country with executive oversight over all major policy affairs including defence, economic policy and foreign affairs. The de facto head of government is the Chairman of the CPO who is understood to be the most powerful individual in Jabar. The unicameral legislature is the Majlis of Jabar (المجلس) whose members are elected every five years with only members of the Arab Islamic National Party (الحزب الوطني الإسلامي العربي) allowed to run for the Majlis. The current Sultan is Omar al-Kamel al-Obeidi, who was appointed as Sultan in 2008, and the current Chairman of the CPO is Abdrabbuh Khalifa who has served in the role since 2002.

The Council of Peace and Order consists of a Central Committee, military bureau and political bureau which run parallel to the Majlis. The Chairman is appointed by the Central Committee which in on itself is made up of members of provincial branches, with the Chairman having the ability to appoint the military and political bureaus which in turn appoints the leaders of the armed forces, the judicial system and the bureaucracy. The CPO also approves of all candidates for the Majlis and local government enabling the CPO to have indirect control over the selection process of all governmental figures.

The Majlis is elected every five years. Jabar operates under the doctrine of "consensus-based sectional democracy" wherein there is a single political party - the Arab Islamic National Party - that seeks to represent all sectors of Jabari society rather than divide itself upon “partisan lines”. In practice the Majlis is a weak body that rubberstamps decisions made by the Council for Peace and Order with the Arab Islamic National Party being little more than an ideological rallying point for the regime.

Jabar officially defines its government as being based on the principles of political Islamism and pan-Arabism. During the early years of the regime Jabar was more identifiably pan-Arabist whilst supporting a moderate form of Sunni Islam before shifting towards more extremist Salafism in the 1980’s. Jabar is often named as a dictatorship, with power centralised in the hands of the Council for Peace and Order, with political dissent to the regime often resulting in imprisonment.

Government

The government of Jabar is based in two entities - the Politburo of the Supreme Revolutionary Congress of the Jamahiriya, the central executive body of the SRCJ made up of delegates from the groups that make up the SRCJ and the Executive Council which consists of several ministries. The Politburo is led by the President and the Executive Council the Premier. Although the President is commonly defined as the head of state and the Premier head of government in reality the posts function more as a diarchy.

The Politburo of the SRCJ is mainly concerned with "representing the people and interests of Jabar" being appointed by the Central Committee whenever a vacancy occurs. The Politburo meets infrequently although it retains enormous power as it has the power to appoint members of key institutions and has ultimate executive authority. Due to its infrequent meetings the President is delegated a large amount of power leading to the President to be the de facto most power person in Jabar. The President is elected by the Central Committee every five years in Ordinary Sessions, but the Central Committee can hold an Extraordinary Session at any time to remove the President. The current President is Mustafa Abdulaziz, who has served in the role since 1988 when he was elected in an Extraordinary Session.

The Executive Council has less powers than the Central Committee but is mainly concerned with the day-to-day running of the country. The Premier is a de jure primus inter pares with his or her main duty being to appoint ministers to the Executive Council. The Executive Council unlike the Central Committee meets regularly to decide policy and is for this reason considered the de facto executive government. The current Premier is Omar Al-Obeidi who was elected to the post in 2008 and is a member of the Jabari Peasants' Mutual Aid Association. The Premier is elected via a complex process every five years - Premiers are nominated by the Majlis with their candidacy then having to be approved by a nationwide referendum. If voters reject the candidacy the Majlis must put forward a new candidate.

Legislature

Governates

File:Jabari regional map numbered.png
Governates of Jabar since 1996

Jabar is a unitary state, divided into 15 governorates (محافظة‎‎; muḥāfaẓāt) and a capital municipality (بلدية‎‎; baladiyah). Governates are further divided into delegations (معتمدية; mutamadiyah) which consist either of urban districts (typically cities and towns) or rural districts (typically villages). Urban districts are divided into quarters (حي; hai) whilst rural districts are divided into villages (قرية; qarya).

A highly centralised state, Jabari local governments exhibit very little autonomy and are merely conduits for the central government to channel policy implementation through. Each province has its own administrative capital.

2
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  1. Al Tarmia
  2. Khaliz
  3. Al-Meshkhab
  4. Hatarah
  5. Kharjah
  6. Rashid
  7. Al Mahrah
  8. Shabaziyah
  9. Shaibah
  10. Zubair
  11. Khaseeb
  12. Al Khiyoot
  13. Shatrah
  14. Al-Ubaid
  15. Muntafiq
  16. Al-Fajir

Armed forces and intelligence

Soldiers in the Alati Army on military parade, 2014

The armed forces of Jabar are known as the Armed Forces of Alatistan which is split into a navy, airforce and army. There also exists Popular Forces for Nautasian Unity, paramilitary groups controlled by the Council of Peace and Order as well as the Alatistan special forces that report directly to the President and Chairman of the CPO. The Defence Council is the highest military body in Alatistan, with its Chairman being the de facto commander-in-chief. The Chairman is the ex officio the Chairman of the CPO and President, although theoretically the positions are all separate. The Chairman of the Defence Council appoints the other members of the Defence Council, who are all senior officers across their respective branches. Conscription is still in use in Alatistan, lasting for 18 months for men. Currently, there are 250,000 active soldiers and 100,000 in reserve.

The main intelligence force in Alatistan are the Military Police Corps (Askeri Polis Birliği) abbreviated to the APB and the National Intelligence Agency (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı) abbreviated to MIT. The APB handles internal affairs and the MIT external affairs. The APB in their role in handling internal affairs effectively function as the regime's secret police detaining political prisoners, controlling the labour camp system and monitoring the population. The MIT are separate from other government institutions reporting directly to the President, often giving them significant political clout to the extent that they are regarded as one of the regimes "three pillars" (alongside the clergy and the military). The MIT in comparison are a treated as a branch of the military, although they report to the foreign ministry rather then the Defence Council. As such the MIT are regarded as inferior in influence and power to the APB.

Human Rights

Jabar's human rights record has been criticised by international organisations such as Esquarian Human Rights Monitor. Jabar's legal code, based mostly on a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law, ascribes flogging, amputation and decapitation as legal punishments for various crimes with Jabar's legal system does not include juries.

The Jabari government do not accept human rights as a fundamental right, stating that Jabar's Islamic character means it does not ascribe to "western conceptions of the rights of people". Jabar has been criticised for its poor human rights in regards to minority and disadvantaged groups. The current Jabari legal code bans homosexuality ascribing the death penalty for it whilst women face "legal discrimination". There has also been criticism over Jabar's religious policy which has been described as intolerant.

The Jabari government has been accused of undertaking forced disappearances and torturing of political opponents, as well as having formal censorship over the media. The Jabari government has categorically denied these allegations.

Foreign relations

File:Volkan and Abdulaziz.jpg
Alati leader Mustafa Öztrak with then-UNIR State President Evren Volkan in 2016

Alatistan's constitution states that its foreign policy principles are neutrality, peaceful cooperation and Nautasian unity. Alatistan is a member of several international organisations such as the International League, the International Forum for Developing States and the Organization of Esquarian Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Despite since the 1960's professing a desire to enter an eventual union with the UNIR, Alatistan under the presidency of İsmet Kavranoğlu was widely regarded as a pariah state being isolated from the rest of world to the extent of being termed a hermit kingdom. Since the start of the presidency of Mustafa Öztrak there has been a détente with the UNIR with the issue of unification being placed a "strategic priority" according to the UNIR government. In 2009 Öztrak stipulated that he envisioned a united Nautasia in a confederation by 2050 and that Alatistan would back union with the UNIR. Despite this foreign observers have stated unification between the two countries is "mired in complications and unlikely to be achieved".

Alatistan has in recent years pursued a policy of Eastern engagement, courting investment from Xiaodong, Namor and Senria amongst others. Relations have also improved with other IFDS member states such as Kheratia and Razaria.

Alatistan has more mixed relations with neighbouring countries such as Mazaristan and Siphria due to their anti-UNIR stances.

Geography

Biodiversity

Climate

Economy

An oil platform off the coast of Jabar

Jabar's economy is predominating based on the state-owned oil sector, which accounts for 90% of Jabar's foreign exports, generating little employment. The Jabari government has committed to diversify the economy away from oil exports as well as open the state-dominated oil sector to foreign investment. As of 2015 Jabar is estimated to have around 101,500 million barrels of oil reserves with its production capacity being 2.5 million barrels per day.

Most of the economy is heavily regulated by the government which has ownership over the Jabari Oil Corporation as well as majority stakes in the banking sector. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1956, Jabar's economy was based on agriculture growing dates and livestock, whilst pearl hunting was also common on the coast. The development of cultured pearls led to the decline of Jabar's pearl industry and sustained falling income until the discovery of oil after which GDP quadrupled. The Jabari civil war damaged Jabar's infrastructure leading to sluggish economic growth.

Whilst economic growth has been steady since the 2000's, Jabar faces multiple challenges to its economy. Jabar has a high unemployment rate especially amongst its youth, whilst having a high population growth rate. Whilst some sectors of the economy have been deregulated or privatised (such as social service provisions) the majority of the economy is closed to foreign investment. There is also concern in Jabar that the government has reached "peak oil" and that its social welfare spending is unsustainable, leading to possible uncontrollable deficits.

Agriculture

Currency

Industry

Services

Energy

Transportation

Demographics

The current population of Kaona is approximately just below 15 million people. Since the early 1980's when population rates fell due to famine Kaona has encountered a rapid rise in its population, doubling from 7 million in 2001 to 14 million by 2013. The 2015 census recorded 14,698,789 people living in Kaona. The fertility rate in Kaona is quite high at 3.1 births per woman, with an average 5.4 people living in each household. Most people either live in the northwest of the country or the south.

Education

Ethnic groups

Healthcare

Language

Largest cities

Religion

Religion in Phikam (census 2015)

  None (17.3%)
  Folk religions (15.7%)
  Christianity (1.9%)
  Other (1.4%)
According to the 2015 census, 63.9% of Kaonese people follow Theravada Buddhism, 15.7% folk religions, 1.9 Christianity, 1.4% other faiths and 17.7 do not identify as religious at all. Kaona officially defines itself as a state atheist country, although critics allege that in recent years it has given patronage to Theravada Buddhist institutions. Kaona's state atheism mean that all religions institutions must adhere to "patriotic, socialist values" and that reactionary beliefs must be "crushed". A report carried out in 2006 showed that most Kaonese people participate in Buddhist rituals and practices, and that most Buddhists also practice folk religions. A survey taken in 2013 saw 27% of Kaonese people regard religion as "very important".

Since the 1300's Islam had been the dominant religion in Kaona, and continues to define Kaonese culture and cultural identity. Islam was the state religion of Kaona up until Luziycan colonisation when it came under attack by Apostolic Catholicism. Muslims were also heavily persecuted in the 1970's-90's by the communist government, but since the mid-2000's Islam has undergone a revival, with official government policy stipulating that Buddhism and socialism are compatible. As such, Islam continues to play a large part in most Kaonese citizens lives - in villages, the monk is second only to the CPK official.

Folk religions remains widely practiced in Kaona, although due to its nature its difficult to ascertain its full extent. Ancestor worship is common, with every year communities in Kaona staged rituals designed to communicate with the spiritual world - often these include mock-fighting and spirit dances. Reportedly, most households in Kaona include shrines used for ancestor worship.

The Arun Wat Prang in Thammachot
Christianity was promoted during Luziycan rule of Kaona, but has since fallen into decline. During the colonial period Apostolic Catholicism was the state religion of Kaona, with natives only getting access to social mobility if they converted to the faith. However Christianity never gained a firm foothold in Kaona as it was seen as a foreign import. The CPK has always been hostile to Christianity, especially when the People's Union was formed in 1951 when Christians were forced to convert away from Christianity. Today, Christians are requiered to be a member of the People's Church of Kaona, with other Christians facing heavy persecution.

Freedom of religion remains a contentious issue for Kaona, especially in its international dealings. Whilst the constitution guarantees freedom of religion, in practice the Kaonese government mandates that religious institutions must be placed under CPK oversight and that religious bodies should adhere to a set of "common values" which are enforced by the Committee for the Preservation of Socialist Values (CPSV), a government body charged with overseeing religious affairs. These common values mandate that religions must recognise the CPK as the "first loyalty of the Kaonese people", which has led to protests and accusations that the government has attempted to politicise religion. In recent years many Kaonese people are turning to Xiaodongese salvationist religions which has led the government to crack down upon beliefs.

Culture

Art

Cuisine

Phad Kao, a popular dish in Kaona
Kaona is known internationally for its distinctive cuisine. Unlike other cuisines in the region, Kaonese cuisine is known for its complexity, harmonising several flavours (sour, sweet, salty, bitter, and spicy) into one whilst also paying great attention to texture, smell and appearance. Its cusine is somewhat influenced by Namor to the west and Xiaodong to the east whose traders brought and traded food with Kaonese merchants historically. Unlike some of its neighbours, Kaonese cuisine utilises non-sticky long-grain rice and traditionally use their hands to eat food rather than use chopsticks (unless eating more Namorese, Xiaodongese and in recent years Senrian and Koy cuisine). Since Luziycan colonisation spoons and forks have been used more to eat food. Food is often served with rice and many complementary dishes.

Popular dishes in Kaona and abroad include phad kao, green curry, tom yum, khao phat and khao soi.

Holidays

Film

Literature

Music

Society

Sports

Television