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| casualties1 = Projected at 500,000-750,000
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Latest revision as of 17:31, 23 September 2021

Operation Titanomchy
DateSeptember or October 2010
Location
Status Never carried out
Belligerents
 Ruvelka
 Acrea
Syara
Æþurheim
Commanders and leaders
Ruvelka Áron Surány
Ruvelka Tibor Fehér
Ruvelka Eliska Hanáková
Ruvelka Péter Novák
Acrea Erich von Rohr
Vakhtang Avakian
Nikodemos Cvetkov
Arisdages Koundakjian
Daniel Mladenov Todorov
Axel Rappe
Units involved
Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka Syaran Commonality Armed Forces
Strength
4,850,000 troops 4,350,000 troops
Casualties and losses
Projected at 500,000-750,000 Projected at 500,000

Operation Titanomachy was a planned Syaran strategic offensive for the Zemplen War. It was to be carried out in the Fall of 2010, sometime between September and October. Titanomachy was intended to deliver a final blow against Ruvelka and force the Ruvelkan government to agree to a ceasefire and negotiations. It was never carried out due to the launch of Operation Homefront, which brought an end to the war in July.

Background

In 2009 the Syaran Commonality Armed Forces (VZS) had launched the Syaran Spring Offensives which aimed to knock Ruvelka out of the war by destroying the Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka as a fighting force. The offensives had failed to defeat Ruvelka but had incurred heavy casualties on both sides, leading Syara to suspend strategic offensive operations for the remainder of the year. Following the Ruvelkan Autumn Counter-Offensive, the front lines had largely stabilized through the winter of 2009-2010, marked by occasional Syaran operations in the north and south of Ruvelka. The deadlock were ill omens for the Syarans, who by this stage in the war were running into financial and economic trouble trying to sustain the war effort.

The administration of Dragomir Zhelev, Executive of Syara had refrained from fully mobilizing the Syaran economy and population out of a belief that the war would originally be a short-term affair, similar to the Imerti Conflict in 2005. By late-2008 it was clear the war was not going to be over quickly, but hoping to maintain public support the Government of Syara had slowly and belatedly introduced measures designed to bring Syara's economy to war footing. These had largely proven insufficient and by late 2009 Syara was facing financial crisis over its efforts to maintain military production. Manpower issues were also growing as conscription policy had been difficult to implement and growing war weariness meant there was a notable shortage of volunteers. By March 2010 the Syaran National Army was 350,000 troops under what its prescribed strength should have been, and most divisions were operating at 70% strength or lower.

The VZS Central Command was wary of undertaking another strategic offensive and hoped to instead switch to a strategically defensive posture, knowing that Ruvelkan Chancellor Edviná Molnár favored the offensive and would force the Ruvelkan military to launch costly attacks on Syaran forces in a defense-in-depth. This plan was considered unfeasible by the Syaran government due to the necessity of committing to an even longer conflict, which they feared Syara would be unable to financially support. Following Operation Toxon, the VZS Central Command began preparations for another major offensive that would hopefully compel Debrecen to seek terms of surrender.

Planning

According to Field Marshal Nikodemos Cvetkov, commander of Army Group Alpha, the commanders of each Syaran Army Group were summoned to Zovahr in late January to discuss plans for a major strategic offensive to take place later in the year. Having failed to defeat the Ruvelkan armed forces in a straight up direct engagement, Defense Minister Vitanov desired a change of pace away from the previous logic from Chief of Staff Vakhtang Avakian. With input from Cvetkov the Operations Directorate eventually produced Operation Titanomachy to be launched in the Fall of 2010. While Cvetkov worried that the forces needed for the offensive might not be prepared by then (and expecting a Ruvelkan counter-offensive sometime in the summer) Vitanov stated that the Syaran Government did not believed it could sustain the war into 2011.

Titanomachy was a three-phase operation. Initial attacks would be conducted by Army Group Alpha in the north and Army Group Gamma in the south, where the terrain was more suited for the offensive owing to the flatter ground and less prominent highlands. After a 10 day assault by two field armies in each Army Group, Army Group Beta in the center under command of Field Marshal Arisdages Koundakjian would launch its own offensive aimed at the heart of the Kurilla Mountains with the intention of threatening the capital of Debrecen. Army Group Beta would have been reinforced with two additional mechanized corps along with all available forces from Æþurheim. Once the Ruvelkan Imperial General Staff had recognized the central push and committed Ruvelka's strategic reserves to halting the push towards the Kurillas, Army Group's Alpha and Gamma would conduct a second offensive with their reserve field army, reinforced to a strength of four corps (instead of the usual three), to punch through Ruvelkan defenses and advance as far east as possible. The goal of Army Group Gamma in the south was to sweep through the Kenderes Steppe and threaten the eastern Matra Mountain passes into eastern Ruvelka, while Army Group Alpha in the north would threaten the port city of Mátészalka, and in turn threaten to pivot south-east thereby circumnaviting the Kurilla Mountains of central Ruvelka.

The plan was essentially a trap within a trap; an initial attack on the flanks left deliberately undermanned and then a high profile thrust to the center. It was hoped that this, combined with the high-profile commitment of Æþurheim forces, would lead the Imperial General Staff to conclude the main target was Army Group Center (the largest of the Ruvelkan formations) and Debrecen would authorize the commitment of Ruvelka's reserves to the center. Once this was done the Syarans would then unleash their actual main effort against the flanks, avoiding the mountainous highlands and the difficult fight it would bring in favor of a massive pincer movement. Cvetkov predicted that with their flanks seriously threatened, the only major port on the Sundering Sea under threat of capture (depriving Ruvelka of badly needed fuel and supplies from its ally Acrea), and her last reserves committed, the Ruvelkans would request a ceasefire rather thank risk the Syarans breaking into the Ruvelkan rear echelon and completely overrunning the country.

Forces required

Titanomachy was considered an ambitious plan that was undermined by a pressing matter; manpower. To fulfill out the formations necessary to carry out the offensive, the VZS needed an additional 650,000 troops. Estimates in January 2010 however predicted that the Syarans would only have a net gain of 350-450,000 by July, short of what was needed. The plan also required the front lines to remain largely static, difficult to manage with Syara's traditionally aggressive an offensive-minded army and corps level commanders, and expectations that the Ruvelkans might launch a pre-emptive offensive. The Syaran government agreed to re-examine conscription regulations in an effort to produce the numbers necessary while the Foreign Ministry would petition Æþurheim for additional forces. All together the VSZ and allies were expected to amount to 4.2 million troops, against an expected Ruvelkan-Acrean force of just under 5 million. The balance of armored vehicles and artillery favored Syara, but in the air the Commonality Air Force was outnumbered by around 200 fighter aircraft.

Outcome

Titanomachy was never launched. In June 2010 Ruvelka launched Operation Homefront, a massive strategic offensive across the entire front line. Syaran intelligence had picked up signs of an impending Ruvelkan offensive in April, but uncertainty over its intended targets meant the scale of the operation caught Syaran commanders off guard. Initially the Ruvelkans made little progress in the first two weeks, but after repeated assaults and attrition Syaran forces began to buckle, and at risk of losing the entire army the order was given to retreat. The Ruvelkans continued to pursue the Syarans until the pre-war borders were reached, at which point a ceasefire was offered and agreed to by Zovahr. The Treaty of Aragon ended the war a few weeks later.

Whether or not Titanomachy would have succeeded has been a matter of debate since it's revelation in Cvetkov's memoirs, which were later acknowledged by the Syaran Ministry of Defense in 2018. Cvetkov stated in his book that the plan's tenets were "fundamentally sound", but questioned whether the "forces needed would have been furnished in time". According to Cvetkov, in May 2010 he put forward an alternate plan which involved stripping Army Group Gamma of much of its reserves to support Army Group Alpha, arguing that his version offered a better chance of success as the available lines of advance were more favorable in the north than in the south. This theory has been disputed by some other Syaran officers, who argue that shifting to many forces north would have been difficult to hide from Ruvelkan intelligence.

While it was never carried out, Titanomachy is credited with shifting Syaran doctrine away from encirclements and total destruction of enemy forces into a mindset focused on maneuver and breakthrough.