Turfan
 From the top clockwise: Women protesters in Faidah March 2005; Komiteh members in Borazjan; Komiteh member protesting near Inqelabe Tower in Zahedan; Hamid Alizadeh with supporters following his rise to the State Presidency in July; Police standing by during protests in Sadah. | |
| Date | 16 February 2005 – 19 July 2008 |
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| Location |  Zorasan |
| Also known as | Revolutionary Rejuvenation Mission |
| Cause |
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| Participants | |
| Outcome |
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| Deaths | Uncertain; estimates range between 3,500-10,000 |
| Missing | Uncertain; estimates range between 3,530-15,500 |
The Turfan (lit. Hurricane), also known within Zorasani historiography as the Revolutionary Correction Mission (Pasdani: اصلاح انقلابی مأموریت; Ma'muriyat-ye Enqelâbi-ye Eslah; Rahelian: مهمة التصحيح الثوري; Muhimma al'Taṣḥīḥ at'Ṯawriyy), was a sociopolitical movement and period of upheaval in Zorasan from February 2005 to July 2008. Long suspected to have been launched the Zorasani military and allies among the Neo-Sattarist right of the National Renovation Front, it began with a series of incidents in several universities where students established Revolutionary Committees (Khomiteh-ye Enqelâbi) to attack and denounce academics linked to the ruling faction of the NRF and those promoting "alien thought." Coinciding with a serious economic crisis, the initial actions of the Khomiteh's spread to wider society, sparking a period of violent civil disorder, which led to the removal of the ruling faction and the establishment of a provisional government which ultimately restored order, economic stability and in 2008 a new constitution.
The origins of the Turfan lay in the 2000 Revolutionary Command Congress which elected Fayzulla Khodzhayi as State President and Daryush Hemko as First Minister, as leaders of a second "Centrist-Reformist" leadership generation. They initially remained restrained to completing the economic reforms of their predecessors (Muhammad Al-Fayez and Hamad Niavarani), though by 2002 they opted to go further and introduced more radical neo-liberal economic reforms, the same year their government began to announce plans to reform the country politically and socially which provoked concern and tension between it and the right-wing Neo-Sattarist faction. The economic reforms were poorly executed and deepened underlying socioeconomic tensions between the urban classes and the wider poor toward a wealthy and often exuberant middle and professional class. By 2004, the NRF's right-wing together with the Zorasani military agitated the populace, provoking the emergence of the Khomiteh movement in February 2005.
On the 14 February 2005, a Khomiteh based at the Sardar Javad Jahandar School of Economics in Zahedan seized control of the main building, attacking violently a number of academics linked to the "Centrist-Reformist" faction of the NRF. They forced a televised confession by academics, denouncing the centrist leadership and demanding forgiveness for "spreading alien thought to dilute the nation's spirit." Televised by pro-hardliner outlets, Khomiteh's emerged in every university and incidents seen at JJSE were repeated across the country. In late March, Khomiteh groups began to emerge among the urban working classes, in factories and other businesses, they in turn began to agitate popular protests on the streets demanding economic stability and the resignation of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration. These protests turned violent in early April as civil disobedience, rioting, looting and score settling erupted across the country, made possible by the refusal of law enforcement and paramilitary units to follow the orders of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration. Fearing the country was slipping into anarchy, the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration promised emergency economic support for the poor and a new legislative agenda. This had no effect on the deteriorating situation, but enabled hardline accusations of poor government and incompetence. On 19 July, a meeting between the senior leaders of the Khodzhayi-Hemko administration and the military resulted in the former's agreement to resign, that night the military alongside Neo-Sattarists announced the establishment of a Provisional National Authority which was to last three years, during which time order would be restored, the economy stabilised and a new constitution adopted. Violence would continue until late August, while a systematic purge was conducted targeting centrist and leftist factions of the NRF. A new constitution consolidating Neo-Sattarist control over the party and granting the military considerable power was adopted, harsh crackdowns on ethnic nationalism would spark the Chanwanese War and an intensification of the Zorasani insurgency, though both would be defeated by 2011.
The Turfan was characterised by violence, chaos and mass civil unrest. The death toll varies widely depending on the inclusion of figures from the PNA-led purge or restricting it to February-August 2005. Accordingly, the period from February to August, an estimated 4,649 people were killed, primarily from score settling, assassinations and looting. Over 1,000 party members were killed during this period for real or suspected ties to the Centrist-Reformist faction. Dating from July 2005 to 2008, an estimated 15,000-20,000 people are believed to have died as a result of incarceration by the Provisional National Authority, this figure includes the disappeared. At least 3,500 were officially sentenced to death by the Provisional Security Tribunal. Various Khomiteh groups used the chaos to attack cultural and religious sites belonging to Zorasan's minorities or groups identified by the Neo-Sattarist state media machine as being "seditionist", notably destroying what few Badist temples were legally permitted. Hundreds of thousands were persecuted by either the Khomiteh movement or the PNA, notably State President Fayzulla Khodzhayi, First Minister Daryush Hemko, Majid Abdullah and Servan Khordani among other party members and civil servants; thousands were accused of being "seditionist" or "propagators of falsehoods" suffering public humiliation, imprisonment, torture, hard labor, seizure of property, and sometimes murder or harassment into suicide; scholars and academics accused of spreading "alien thought" were also targeted, with a large number of academics involved in economics or social sciences exiled abroad or disappeared.
The Provisional National Authority's purge coupled with the 2008 constitution established the near total control of government at all levels by the Neo-Sattarist faction of the National Renovation Front. A number of state owned by pro-reformist media outlets were shutdown and the media landscaped became monopolised by the hardliners, while the military was granted a considerable presence through its own outlets. The PNA oversaw dramatic reforms to the economy, rolling back many of the neoliberal policies of the previous two governments and introduced Patriotic Economic Development as its guiding principle, a neomercantilist form of state capitalism. By 2007, Zorasan's economy became one of the fastest growing globally as the developed world struggled with the 2005 Economic Crash. This economic boom was balanced out by increased repression and a return to near totalitarianism that defined the first decade of the UZIR's existence and remains today. Many historians note that the Turfan remains the most consequential event of post-unification Zorasan.
Origins
"Centrist-Reformist Faction" and the Saffron Era
Following the Zorasani victory in the Second Rahelian War and the eventual unification of the country in 1980, as the Union of Zorasani Irfanic Republics, the ruling National Renovation Front afforded itself ten years of totalitarian control over the country to “facilitate the stabilisation and rebirth of the homeland.” During the early to mid-1980s, it faced several failed revolts and uprisings in the former United Rahelian People’s Republic as the country consolidated itself. A series of crackdowns and purges retained firm control over the populace and by 1986, the situation had stabilised to such a degree that the military was steadily withdrawn from the former URPR states of Riyadha and Irvadistan.
In 1984, State President Javad Jahandar died and was succeeded by Attallah Shahedeh. He would oversee the final stages of the Consolidation Period and in the late 1980s began to implement economic reforms aimed at liberalising the economy and reducing state control. This was coupled with a steady repeal of the many draconian measures introduced post-war to stabilise the country. One such element of this effort was the “Opening of the Floor” – a policy of enabling freer debate within the NRF on the country’s direction during the 1990 Revolutionary Command Congress. The reforms of the late 1980s served to birth a faction dubbed the “Centrist-Reformist Group” (CRG) which advocated greater economic reform, closer ties to the developed world for investment opportunities and a more technocratic-authoritarian regime over the ideological and dogmatic totalitarian state of the day.
In a speech to party members in 1989, State President Attallah Shahedeh offered his endorsement of the CRG saying, “we now find ourselves in such sufficient position of peace and social harmony that we may begin the good work of lifting our nation and people up from poverty and the shadows of sacrifice into the land of plenty.” In preparation for the 1990 Revolutionary Command Congress, Shahedeh, who retained significant influence over the party orchestrated the rise of Abdulmalik Jamhour as his successor. Jamhour, who served Minister for Finance from 1985 to 1990 was elected State President, while Ershad Entezami was elected First Minister, both members of the CRG. Half of the Central Committee of State was drawn from the CRG also, while the RCC confirmed a near exclusively CRG Council of Union Ministers. This marked the beginning of the so-called Saffron Era, a period of profound change, reform and growing prosperity.
The CRG-led government in 1991 began to implement its “Comprehensive Strategy for National and Economic Transformation.” Working on from the reforms of the Shahedeh-led government of the late 1980s, the CRG-leadership continued to expand private property rights, improve business laws, privatise inefficient state-owned enterprises – though slowly as to avoid mass layoffs culminating into a employment crisis, and modernising the remaining state-owned industries. Aided by relatively high energy prices, the CRG-leadership also launched the most expansive infrastructure building campaign in Zorasani history. Throughout the early 1990s, the CRG-leadership worked to foster closer ties with Euclean countries, to boost exports and to secure foreign investments. State control over private business as well as interventionism was reduced and new joint-stock companies including banks and insurance companies were established. In 1993, Bandar e-Sattari, Chaboksar, Izidhar al-Mina and Khadal were declared “Special Economic and Industrial Zones.” These cities were also granted special political status, enabling significant autonomy and liberalisation socially speaking. By 1995, Zorasan’s economy was growing by 12% on average. This rate of growth would continue uninterrupted until 2002 when the successor CRG-led government began to mismanage the economy, during the same period until 2002, living standards improved as did disposable incomes for millions, notably for urban workers.
The success of the reforms led to a exponential rise in the number of party members affiliated with the CRG. This was the case both within the national level and below across the Union Republics and locally. The side-effect of this was that in 1995, CRG-affiliated members assumed control of significant sectors of the party and the Zorasani state apparatus. This would alienate the leftist and right-wing factions of the NRF, who saw a loss of influence and power at all three levels of government. Many historians believe the boost in CRG membership was due to a widespread belief that support for the agenda would open up financial and business opportunities for party members and their relatives, the failure of the CRG-leadership of the time to combat this ostensibly led to the establishment of patronage networks, nepotism and ultimately corruption at an unprecedented level, another factor that would lead to the Turfan ten years later.
Factionalism
The National Renovation Front since its founding in 1924, as the political arm of the Pardarian Revolutionary Resistance Command and as the ruling party of the Union of Khazestan and Pardaran was marred by factionalism along ideological lines. The level of factionalism was kept in check by the conscious efforts of successive leaders to balance the “apex” between the factions, though throughout the Arduous Revolution (1950-1980), the factions remained relatively united through the shared goal of achieving national unification.
Once unification had been achieved in 1980, the fissures began to widen. Division had emerged prior, following the Irfanisation of Party and State in 1971, under Ghassan Gharazi in which socialism was dropped from the Sattarist platform for a form of political Irfan. This left a sufficient left-wing faction that still advocated for socialistic economic policy that would remain active until the Turfan. The Irfanisation resulted in the emergence of Neo-Sattarism as the dominant ideology of the right-wing, while the reforms of the late 1980s birthed the Centrist-Reformist Group.
Unity between the three factions remained relatively firm during the first term of the Jamhour-Entezami leadership due to the tradition of collective government and commitment to economic reform. However, the rapid expansion of CRG-aligned members throughout the NRF began to alienate the leftist and rightist factions, who would see near total exclusion from the Central Authority (the senior executive level) and the loss of Union Republic governments. The 1995 Revolutionary Command Congress’s handing of hegemonic control to the centrist faction also led to an overconfidence in support by the CRG-leadership, who promptly in 1996 stepped up reform of the economy and moved toward liberalising the country socially and politically, this in turn disturbed the leftist and rightist factions, with the latter especially viewing the new agenda as revisionist and threatening to the stability of the one-party state. The corruption that emerged out of the economic opening up also further fuelled factionalism, as the left and right were side-lined they lost access to the various financial opportunities that enriched many CRG-aligned office holders, feeding a considerable grievance against the dominant faction.
The fourth element to factionalism was the military and Irfanic religious establishment, both were firm bastions of Neo-Sattarism, with the military having long been seen as the ultimate arbiter of political affairs in the country. However, with the success of the reforms, the popularity of the CRG-led party-state began to eclipse that of the military, threatening its one superior position in terms of civil-military relations. The Irfanic clergy for its part mistrusted the CRG's reformism as a "sleep walk toward decadence and godlessness." Both the clergy and military during the 1990s issued missives and warnings urging for restraint in reform, while the military made repeated warnings that would it not brook total divergence from Sattarism.
Khodzhayi-Hemko leadership generation
The 2000 Revolutionary Command Congress would be one of the pivotal moments leading to the Turfan due to the consolidation of CRG dominance over the NRF and further marginalisation of the leftist and rightist factions. With Jamhour-Entezami administration reaching its term limit, a new leadership was elected. Prominent CRG supporter and Union Minister for International Trade Fayzulla Khodzhayi was elected State President and Daryush Hemko as First Minister. The Neo-Sattarist right suspected foul practices due to the long-term expectation that Jafar Reza Azhari, the Union Minister for Finance would succeed Jamhour. The RCC also once again elected CRG-affiliated party members to the Central Committee, Union Ministries and other state bodies, denying the right any influence over party or government policy.
Khodzhayi during the Jamhour-Entezami government had become the “poster child” for the new Zorasan as well as its most vocal advocate for further free market reform. Controversially for many on the right of the NRF, Khodzhayi was also an advocate for what he called “softening the street”, loosening social and cultural restrictions to enable a more free and open society. This served to also disturb the Irfanic establishment, who would regularly misconstrue this for an agenda of secularisation and laxing social norms. His deputy and the head of government, Daryush Hemko however, was more respected by the right of the NRF, who saw him as a moderate and fixated on reforming heavy industry and improving worker’s rights. Hemko, a Kexri was known throughout the late stages of the Saffron Era of distrusting Khodzhayi and the two did not enjoy a close working relationship. In the 2004-2005 period, Khodzhayi worked to isolate and side-line Hemko, stacking the Secretariat of the State Presidency with allies and yes-men, while simaltaneously centralising many of the executive's duties into the SSP, contrary to conventions on collective leadership
In the weeks that followed the Command Congress, a number of articles appeared in party literature criticising Khodzhayi’s “flash” and highly “personalistic approach” to government. Many on the right disliked his telegenic manner and extensive use of television and photo opportunities to present himself as a modern head of state and party leader. Khodzhayi would respond bullishly to criticism and often mocked the party’s right wing as “antiquated and reactionary.” His approach to relations with the military would also be confrontational and bitter.
Economic reforms and socioeconomic tensions
The economic boom that followed unification in the mid and late 1980s, coupled with the reforms of the Jamhour-Entezami leadership unleashed near universal improvements in living standards and disposable incomes. Both leadership generations under Shahedeh and Jamhour respectively were conscious to ensure wage growth among the poorest urban and rural populations. The use of high oil prices to fund the construction and development of manufacturing industries and non-fossil fuel mining enabled the government to tackle the previously stubbornly high unemployment rate and inflation, while de-mobilisation of the Zorasani Irfanic Revolutionary Army led to the creation of the Army of the Builders of the Union to staff infrastructure projects. As historian Henrik Groen remarked, “the 1985-1995 period saw a consistent effort on part of the state to ensure economic reform and growth was inclusive, the fear, itself rooted in Sattarist dogma was the emergence of class grievance and class inequality, ostensibly threatening Ettehâd, the metaphysical and spiritual community structure of the totalitarian state.”
The 1995 Revolutionary Command Congress which considerably empowered the CRG and its reform agenda saw a diminishment in the value of Ettehad, primarily among CRG leaders. This in turn resulted in a declining care for guaranteeing inclusivity in increasing national wealth. The establishment of the Special Economic and Industrial Zones (SEIZs) and Regional Development Districts (RDDs) would not only birth severe income inequality between the stratas of Zorasani society but also regionally. Stark disparities existed between the Union Republics, as well as between the cities and rural regions within the Union Republics, through increasing ownership of television sets, the lower rural and urban classes would be subject to repeated images of success and wealth of the cities and certain Union Republics, fostering a growing tension within Zorasani society where millions felt isolated from the country’s success.
As industrialisation of cities outpaced the liberalisation of land ownership and agriculture, mass migrations to cities began, itself outpacing job creation, by 2005 this had resulted in the creation of a class of urban dwellers relying on day-to-day labouring work that was often poorly paid and where exploitation was guaranteed. Dubbed “Sabur” (The Patient), this urban under-class would number an estimated 8 million by 2005 and would be near entirely dependent upon social welfare to feed their families, these welfare programmes would be abolished by the Khodzhayi-Hemko leadership in late 2004, a widely perceived spark of the wider unrest of the Turfan.
As urban areas witnessed a surge in deprivation and poverty, conversely the emerging middle class in Zorasan’s cities in the late 1990s and early 2000s saw unrestrained growth in incomes and living standards. The warming ties between the CRG-led government and Euclea soon enabled the emergence of Euclean brands and cultural memes. Clothing, fast cars, jewellery and the affordability of international travel though heralded as signs of Zorasan’s “modernisation and development” were seen as threats to national stability by the NRF’s right wing, the military and Irfanic establishment.
The rise of Izidhar al-Mina as a “playground for the wealthy” due to its non-existence tax regime, free trade policies and laxer social restrictions fuelled what senior Neo-Sattarist, Manouchehr Amouzegar warned was a “burning image of inequity, exuberance, luxury and decadence.” The materialistic underpinnings of the CRG as a faction in part led to the lauding of displays of wealth as a confirmation of its own political reformist success, while ignoring the decades-long Sattarist rejection of materialism as the “womb of individualism.” This ideological opposition is also credited with the brutal action taken by the NRF’s right and its allies.
Economic crisis
At the 2002 Revolutionary Command Congress, the Khodazhyi-Hemko administration presented its "Plan for the Systematic Reform of the National Economy" which focused on driving diversification away from petrochemicals by introducing a free market-style reform package into the wider economy, including efforts to establish greater domestic consumption, much reduced state interventionism and privatising over 300 state-owned enterprises. The proposal found opposition from the left and right, but owing to the dominating position of the CRG among the delegates passed with overwhelming support.
Beginning in late 2002, the government began a nationwide privatisation of state-owned enterprises, these SOEs however were bodies earmarked by the previous administration and were small to medium in size, rarely employing over 600 people and focused on light industries. However, unlike the previous administration which relied upon state programmes to rehire these workers, the Khodazhyi-Hemko administration abolished these schemes in pursuit of a budget surplus, as such, unemployment would steadily rise for the next three years. This was followed in 2003 by a cap on wage increases across all SOEs to the private sector average, and in late 2003, a law prohibiting the preferential treatment of SOEs in securing loans or credit. In 2004, the government passed the "Financial Responsibility Act" which allowed SOEs to declare bankruptcy, ending the historic culture of sustaining SOEs despite zero competitiveness or profit, within the first months of 2004, over 200 SOEs of all sizes declared bankruptcy and were liquidated leading to over 1.5 million people being laid-off, with virtually no social safety net upon which to fall upon.
The existing system of documenting private business and poorly regulated banking system had led to a culture of credit being lent to private businesses without sufficient back checks on their finances. In the same period of 2004, the government expanded reforms of the banking system by introducing tighter regulations on lending, cutting off hundreds of private firms, mostly in the construction sector from loans. By mid-2004, this began a snowballing effect of hundreds of construction firms declaring bankruptcy who used bank lending for liquidity and ad-hoc and equally poorly regulated state constructions to remain afloat. The collapse of Zorasan's nascent private construction sector led to further unemployment and a catastrophic loss for the Sabur urban-day workers. By the summer, unemployment had surged to 10.9%, while unemployment among 18-24 year olds had exploded to 18.88%. The credit restrictions and bankruptcy law would continuously feed into rising unemployment until 2006.
That summer, the government was adamant the situation would be a short-term pain for medium to long-term benefit and refused to alter course. The summer of 2004 also saw the abolition of the "State Fuel Support Scheme" which provided subsidised energy for the country's poorest, beginning in urban areas. This coupled with the surging global energy prices pushed over 4 million Zorasanis into fuel poverty, consumer spending also began to decline further degrading economic growth. Fearing the situation would worsen, the government began printing money as a means of stimulating the economy and to provide credit through state-owned banks to private firms to alleviate unemployment, this process failed but inadvertently fed into a rise in inflation, which worsened the cost of living for many unemployed and the lower classes. Many producers domestically placed the cost of higher imports onto the consumer, which locked the country into an inflationary doom loop.