Civil-Military State

The Civil-Military State (دولت شهری آرتشی; Dowlat-ye Šahri-e Arteši), also known by the neologism of Nezam (سیستم; lit. System), is a term used to describe the structure of government of the Union of Zorasani Irfanic Republics. The term refers specifically to the system of government introduced with the 2008 Instrument of Union, the country’s constitution.

The system was devised and adopted for the purpose of providing stability in wake of the Turfan (2005-06), both in terms of society and the economy, which had been destabilised years prior by overzealous and poorly executed reforms under two successive liberal governments. By providing an constitutionally mandated space for the military within the central government, it was seen to provide a strong and popular check on the ambitions and agendas of the elected government.

Officially, the system delineates the powers and responsibilities afforded to the military and does so in the aim of fusing these together with the elected government, ostensibly to preserve the country’s multi-party parliamentary democracy. The system places the Central Command Council within, but independent of, the executive branch, and grants the military body significant influence over the judiciary and a dominating position within the legislative branch. These powers provide a separate check and balance on the elected government from within its own branch but through the other two, while this does achieve the stated goal of the system to restrain a reformist government, in reality it undermines the elected government and secures the Zorasani military as the true final arbiter of the political process.

Within Zorasan, the system divides opinion, generally along political party lines, with those of the centre-right and right-wing seeing it as a manifestation of the Union Fathers vision of a Union between the “Mazar, Barracks and Street”, and a guarantee of economic, political, and social stability, those of the centre and left see it as constructing an authoritarian, albeit constitutional military regime.

Origins

Main article: Union of Khazestan and Pardaran

See also: Zorasani Unification

The history of Zorasan including the period of Zorasani unification (1948-1980), through its predecessor state, the Union of Khazestan and Pardaran, saw the military play the most prominent role in state-building and governance post-independence. The UKP was governed as a single-party state under the military, which organised and led the sole legal political entity. The UKP’s extreme militarism and the establishment of a collective cult of personality around the institution would be maintained post-1980 for a period of ten years.

The first five years of the UZIR’s existence, the military regime was retained, even if it did so to steadily prepare for democratic elections and a new constitution in 1985. The constitution adopted that year, while introducing a multi-party parliamentary democracy, provided the military certain rights and privileges, including it producing its own budget, retaining its vast business interests and exemptions from some laws. The military’s extensive media empire was vital in the continuation of the “army cult” (Arteš-ye Ferqe), this in turn secured the military as the most popular and trusted institution in the new state.

In 1990, the liberal-centre left Peace and Harmony Alliance won that year’s elections, sweeping into power Abdelraouf Wazzan as State President. Wazzan sought to modernise and expediate Zorasan’s economic and social liberalisation, however, he was cognisant of the military’s conservative nature and worked to co-opt the armed forces into supporting his reformist agenda. Between 1990 and 2000, the Wazzan government succeeded in doing so, mainly by avoiding the military’s business interests and media empire, he gained their support in expanding privatisation, softening the left-over policies of the Normalisation and promoting a more open and vibrant press. Wazzan also preserved the role of the Irfanic clerical establishment and the military’s role in society. His economic reforms though designed for long-term durations, succeeded in unleashing record breaking sustained economic growth and lifted an estimated 55 million people out of poverty.

In 2000, with Wazzan forced to leave office owed to term limits, he was succeeded by Ekrem Dalan, who’s National Reform Front had seized control of Peace and Harmony. Unlike Wazzan, Dalan was more identifiable as a neo-liberal and sought to expel the military entirely from government and society in the hope of establishing Zorasan as close to a modern liberal democracy as he could. This also involved his desires to secularise Zorasan and expel the Irfanic clergy from politics and governance. Ignoring calls for restraint from his predecessor and erstwhile mentor, Wazzan pursued his reforms with little to no regard to opposing opinion or input. By 2002, he had entered a fierce power-struggle with the military, with the latter aided and supported by conservative parties.

In 2002, a group of unnamed military officers produced a short book formulating a proposed “system of government, that would be built upon the single word: moderation.” This government would provide a constitutional role for the military in executive, legislative and judicial matters, while preserving popular democracy. The book caused a sensation among political commentators but had little effect on the wider population. However, the book would later re-emerge in 2005 as a progenitor for the Civil-Military System.

Turfan

Main article: Turfan

In 2004, Dalan’s economic reforms and extensive, yet rapid privatisations of major state-owned enterprises sent shockwaves throughout Zorasan’s economy. Poorly executed reforms to the Zorasani General Petroleum Corporation (ZORGEN), disrupted oil and gas productions, fluctuating the global energy price. Dalan’s reforms prior to 2004 also served to fuel a meteoric rise in income inequalities, while the privatisation program sent over 1.2 million workers into unemployment in the space of a year. In response to attacks and criticisms from the Irfanic clergy, Dalan announced plans to ban clerics from being elected to public office, provoking a backlash from the conservative urban and rural poor. This anger and division led to the Sangar Incident, a foiled plot by mid-ranking army officers to stage a coup.

By 2005, the military owned media outlets began to attack the government and spread conspiracy theories. These outlets repeated claims that Dalan sought to sell ZORGEN to Euclean companies mobilised popular anger on the right, while the military’s own condemnations of inequality garnered the support of the urban and rural poor. Numerous nationalist and Sattarist societies, clubs and groups began to agitate against the government, demanding its resignation. To which Dalan rejected and insulted the unemployed in a series of gaffes.

In February 2005, mass protests erupted at several universities, where Sattarist student groups occupied campuses and conducted mock trials of academics who they accused of being neo-liberal sell outs. The student protests then escalated into a national protest movement, uniting the working and middle classes with the conservative parties, military, and clerics against Dalan’s government. The military repeated vowed not to intervene to restore civil order, while the police forces in Zorasan also showed restraint. Even as the protests began to torch businesses, institutions, and symbols of “Dalan’s upper-class”, the military’s media outlets continued to peddle conspiracy theories aimed at further fermenting unrest.

In June, the military for the first time lauded the idea of a new “civic-military state apparatus,” which saw welcoming and supportive rhetoric from right-wing parties. That month, Hamid Alizadeh, a right-wing neo-sattarist was elected candidate for state president for the True Way electoral group, which was immediately lavished with military support. In July, Dalan’s government was swept aside in a colossal True Way landslide, aided by the disappearance of over 60 MPs and candidates for Dalan’s Peace and Harmony alliance. Of the 60, 11 were reportedly assassinated or attacked by protesters, while the remaining 49 remain missing to this day.

On the first day of Alizadeh’s term, the military was deployed to cities across the country, restoring order with little to no resistance from the protest movements. The military media outlets began to focus their news stories on the potential of the new government.

Supreme Constitutional Committee

On 3 August 2005, Alizadeh announced the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional Committee, comprised of leading True Way figures and key individuals from the military. The task of the SCC was to devise a “temporary yet stabilising basic law that would restore Zorasan to the path of prosperity.” On the 4 August, Sadavir Hatami was appointed Chairman of the SCC. Hatami, a prominent general, was widely suspected of being one of the authors of the 2002 book that theorised a “civil-military state.”

By November that year, the SCC produced a preliminary outline of its proposed temporary constitution. In which it stated, “the basic premise of this temporary instrument of union, is that the military and elected government, as chosen by the people, would work hand-in-hand, concentrating on areas of respective expertise to provide stabilising good governance, with moderation and discipline in all matters.” During the immediate aftermath of the July elections, thousands of people were disappeared or arrested by the military’s General Intelligence Directorate. These included former politicians under the previous government, its supporters, as well as thousands of human rights activists, journalists, artists and academics.

On 1 January 2006, the SCC officially presented its completed document to the Popular Assembly of the Union. The document was well-received by the all-dominant True Way alliance and the centre-right parties. The centrist and left-wing opposition condemned the document as a return to military rule. On the 5 January, the Alizadeh government proposed a referendum on the new constitution to the Popular Assembly, to be held in July that year. The motion passed with only the left-wing parties voting against the referendum.

Adoption

Main article: 2006 Zorasani constitutional referendum

The official campaign for the referendum began on the 1 March, thought notably the campaign for those against the new constitution, though registered with the Union Electoral Commission, failed to materialise, with many of those most able to lead it either in prison or missing, the pro-military camp led by State President Alizadeh competed against no meaningful opposition. The Zorasani press, which had been decimated in the aftermath of the election through military raids and the closure of hundreds of left-leaning outlets, meant that the media sector was near unanimous in support of the new constitution.

On 10 July, the referendum passed with 88% of the popular vote, though turnout was only an estimated 60%. Throughout the campaign, Alizadeh and his True Way allies repeatedly promised that the document would only be in force for a period of ten years, until the “economic damage wrought by the enemy from within could be repaired.” It would take force on 20 March 2008, the Zorasani new year, and ostensibly last until 2018. The constitution remains in force today.

The state

The Second Instrument of Union, Zorasan’s constitution was defined in a separate document produced by the Supreme Constitutional Committee in 2006. The “Delineation of the Civil-Military State Apparatus” sought to explain the powers and responsibilities handed to the military, and then mandating the elected government’s relationship to those afforded powers.

Military

Under the Second Instrument of Union, the Zorasani Irfanic Revolutionary Army was granted expansive powers and a formalised role within the state beyond its traditional provision of defence and power projection.

Executive

The most notably provision was the establishment of the Central Command Council, the most senior body of the armed forces, as part of the executive branch, yet independent of the elected government. This situation though on paper is meant to ensure the military only involves itself in matters defined in the Second Instrument of Union (defence, foreign policy and internal security), in reality, the Central Command Council has been known to exert its influence over social and economic affairs. Since 2008, the CCC has repeatedly stated that it would involve itself in all areas of government to ensure "moderation in reform", while not explicitly opposing any reforms. It has been known to champion certain reforms, including further pro-market reforms to the economy, social welfare, women's rights and has even led the elected government into reforms aimed at championing innovation and entrepreneurialism.

The powers involving the executive branch afforded to the CCC are:

• Provide advice and the final policy confirmation for matters relating to foreign, security, defence and internal security.
• Approve or veto government policies relating to foreign relations, internal security and national defence.
• Confirm or reject the First Minister’s appointments for the Union Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, National Defence and Justice.
  • Propose candidates for the Internal and Defence Ministries.

Legislative

The military's powers defined in the Second Instrument of Union in relation to the legislative branch are expansive and provide it with its dominating position within the political process. Owing to the liberal-reformist supermajorities seen in the 1990-2005 period, the Second Instrument was designed to deny any elected government the means to force through legislation that would "jeopardise the social and economic stability of the Union." This done by handing two-thirds of seats in the Superior Assembly of the Union (the upper-chamber) to the military’s political group, Zorasan Zendebad. These seats are held by officers appointed by the Central Command Council and are held for a single ten-year term. Among the 2/3rd members are life-members, who are awarded these seats upon securing the rank of general or its equivalent in other branches. As a further consequence to the military's position in the upper chamber, the election of a State President (the head of state), is dependent upon the candidates securing the backing of the military. This ensures that the head of state is both supportive of the military and compliant within the political framework.

The military is also granted the right to appoint chairpersons to the joint legislative committees for foreign affairs, defence, internal affairs, law enforcement and intelligence. Specific to the defence and state security committees, the military possesses the right to withhold information or shut down meetings if inquiries breach areas of “national security that would endanger stability.” The military has been known to shut down committee meetings pertaining to human rights abuses by military agencies, while also utilising its appointed chairpersons to remove members who continue to push for investigations.

One of the most controversial elements of the Civil-Military State is the military’s control of the Union Electoral Commission. The Central Command Council is mandated to appoint the chair and deputy chair of the body which manages and organises all elections in the country; local, state and federal. The Union Electoral Commission is also mandated to vet candidates for public office at all three levels, enabling the military by extension to control those who are viable for public office. Nominally, the UEC vets candidates on the basis of criminal records, citizenship and their financial situation, however, the UEC also vets candidates on the basis of their public statements in regard to the Civil-Military State. In 2015 and 2019, the UEC blocked candidates who expressed criticism of the True Way government and particularly, First Minister Farzad Akbari.

The most criticised point of the UEC is its right to invalidate elections, granting the military the power to invalidate the results of elections not seen to be in their interest. While the UEC has not invalidated any election since 2008, it did invalidate several constituency results of several prominent human rights activists who ran for office in 2015. The opposition press claimed this was work of the Central Command Council, who wished to avoid Shoreh Kadivar, one of the most high-profile activists gaining a loudspeaker by virtue of being a member of parliament. In 2020, several opposition politicians revealed their fears that the UEC would invalidate a national election in the event of the True Way government being defeated.