Obie Chinwe

General Obie Chinwe
Chinwe in 1958
President of Tiwura
In office July 30, 1954 – June 8, 1966
Preceded by	Derrick Clearmont
Succeeded by	Reese Okparro Ndulu
Personal details
Born	(1917-10-04)October 4, 1917 Mbluna, Royal Coast
Died	June 8, 1966(1966-06-08) (aged 48) Omamiri, Tiwura
Manner of death	Assassination
Nationality	Tiwuran
Political party	Tiwuran Prosperity Party
Spouse	Anamaria Okeke (m. 1949)
Children	4
Profession	Soldier
Military service
Allegiance	Template:Country data Estmere Tiwura
Branch/service	Template:Country data Estmere Royal Coast Rifles Tiwuran Army
Years of service	1941–1950 (Estmere) 1950–1966 (Tiwura)
Rank	Major (Estmere) General (Tiwura)
Battles/wars	Solarian War Horo Rebellion

Obie Chinwe (4 October 1917-8 June 1966) was a General in the Tiwuran Armed Forces and served as the second President of Tiwura from 1954 to 1966. Obie Chinwe ruled as Tiwura's first military dictator and his rule began the nation's 50 year-long span of dictatorship. Chinwe would rise to power via a coup in 1954, ousting Derrick Clearmont and establishing a militarist regime. Chinwe would rule for twelve years, with his final years of rule being marked by his attempted invasion of Yemet in the Bulamu War, which ultimately led to defeat and his eventual assassination.

Chinwe was born in 1917 in Mbluna, located today in Nimororu. Chinwe's father was a miner and would work in the mines outside Mbluna. Chinwe's older brother, Amadi, would fight in the Great War during the Gaullican invasion of the Royal Coast. Chinwe would afterwards enlist and serve in the Bahian front of the Solarian War as an officer of the Royal Coast Rifles. After independence, Chinwe would remain in his position and be promoted to general in 1950. During this period Chinwe grew discontent with the leadership of Clearmont after the disaster of the Horo Rebellion, and would launch a coup against him along with several other military officers and politicians.

Chinwe's rise to power came with the support of Estmere, who he would grant access to Tiwura's oil reserves for military and economic support. Chinwe was incredibly popular during his first years as President, constructing new roads and other infrastrucure projects across Tiwura. However, Chinwe would be openly against Pan-Bahianism, believing it would destroy Tiwura's identity and power in the region. This led to the arrests of thousands of suspected pan-bahianists and socialists across the country, as he claimed they were a threat to his power. This period also saw Chinwe's transformation of the National Identity Movement into a Mwo-based program, beginning the rise of Tiwuran Mwo-supremacism, which was clearly detailed in many of his speeches. He also would begin claiming neighboring Obergond territory, seeing the ethnic divide of the Ouloume peoples as a threat to unity in Tiwura. Chinwe would ramp up these actions with the rise of the United Bahian Republic in the early 60s with the new Yemeti nation. The Tiwuran economy also would begin to plunder as foreign suppliers such as Estmere began to look towards other sources for oil and more investors saw Bahia as too dangerous to do business in with the UBR's growth.

After a coup attempt in 1961, Chinwe reorganized the government, beginning "democratization" by dissolving the military council and forming a civilian senate to weaken fellow military leaders. In 1964, Chinwe would build up whatever military forces Tiwura had as more threats arose from with inside with insurgencies arising across the country. He would launch the invasion of Yemet, the Bulamu War, in 1964. The war would be a tragedy and cost Tiwura thousands of lives and saw Chinwe's eventual surrender to Yemet. This failure brought about rising rebellions in remote regions, and the military leaders of Tiwura would see him as too weak to rule and assassinated Chinwe in 1966, leading to a power vacuum that would begin the First Tiwuran Civil War.

Today Obie Chinwe is viewed by most to be a tyrant. His rule saw several human rights abuses, from extrajudicial killings, political repression, ethnic persecution, and persecution. Experts from across the world believe Chinwe would be directly responsible for death of 20,000 Tiwurans, not including those killed during the Yemeti war.

Early Life

Chinwe is a member of the Ochejemi people, a subgroup of the Mwo people, and was born in the small village of Mbluna, located in the modern-day province of Nimororu. Mbluna is located 25 miles north of Haridam, the closest urban center. His father, Ikenna Chinwe, was a miner who worked near Haridam and would often leave Obie with his mother, Oluchi. Chinwe's elder brother, Amadi, would be first of his family to enlish in the Royal Coast Rifles. Here Amadi would take part in the Great War, where he would fight during the Gaullican invasion of the Royal Coast. In 1938, Obie would be employed by his uncle in Ponulo where he would work at a newspaper printing company and work there until 1941.

Military Career

Chinwe would join Royal Coast Rifles in 1941 and join be one of the few Bahians to be able to receive of the position of officer. Chinwe claimed this was due to Amadi's previous service in the RCR. Chinwe would first see action during the Solarian War, being a commander in one of the few RCR units deployed to fight Etrurian forces. Following this service, he would be one of the RCR's most prominent Bahian officers. In 1948, Chinwe would join the Tiwuran Advancement Society, which sought to bring about Tiwuran Independence. However, the group was also infamously Mwo nationalist, and often blamed for Chinwe's political stance as president. In 1949, he would announce his support for NIMORC.

After the independence of Tiwura in 1950, Chinwe would be promoted to general by President Derrick Clearmont due to his service in the Solarian War. In 1950 and 1951, Chinwe would take command of the 1st Army, which was located around Omamiri. During his time in Omamiri, Chinwe would make connections with local soldiers and police. Chinwe is said to have often been seen visiting police stations and conversing with chiefs and officers. Chinwe would also become close with Estmerish business leaders who would often meet with Clearmont and other officials from the southeast regarding security and business prospects. Chinwe would often be directed to protect the oil infrastructure of foreign companies. In late 1950, the 1st Army would begin requesting more funding from the central government. This was temporarily granted, but was ultimately revoked due to the relative stability of the southeast and the need for funding in Clearmont's National Identity Movement and more military resources being sent to the unstable west. Chinwe was reportedly outraged at this, and he went to Clearmont's office to ask for this change to be reversed, although it never was. In mid 1951, Chinwe would begin receiving recruits from the west of Tiwura.

Chinwe as commander of the 1st Army during an Estmerish visit

This change saw a demographic split in the 1st Army, and the majority Mwo troops would demand that the western soldiers be tranferred into the 3rd Army under the command of Jules Afani. Chinwe would agree with his men, and asked Clearmont to transfer the soldiers west, which Clearmont agreed to do, although the agreement they reached stated that the 1st Army would be roughly 80% soldiers from the southeastern provinces. In October of 1951, Chinwe would join Minister of Defense Dwem Vershima in a visit to Estmere to meet with members of the Estmerish Defense Forces. During this visit, the Tiwuran commanders would ask Estmere for economic support to protect their interests in Tiwura due to a rising resistance to Estmerish involvement in the form of socialist and Pan-Bahianist movements, although it is unknown whether this actually ended up influencing Estmerish government.

In early 1952, Chinwe had become TAF's most prominent members. In 1952, when the Horo Rebellion began, Chinwe would be transferred from command of the 1st Army to the 3rd Army by Clearmont, who believed that Afani was not capable of defeating the rebels after 100 soldiers were killed within the first week. Upon his arrival to the west, Chinwe struggled to organize an effective attack against the rebels. Many Irfani soldiers, a significant number of which were Horo, joined the rebels throughout the conflict. In response, Chinwe would primarily deploy Sotirian and Bahian Fetishist to the front. In the weeks the followed, the 3rd Army attempted a scorched-earth campaign to eliminate the rebels, with Chinwe using religion as a motivating factor for the soldiers. This method would result in a high death tool for both rebel and government forces. It also resulted in 7,000 civilian deaths, mostly attributed to the usage of mortar shelling on villages in Eastern Horoland. In a month, the rebellion was subdued.

This costly victory was controversial, and Chinwe was not satisfied with his command of the 3rd Army, and requested transfer back to Omamiri, which he was granted. Upon his return to Omamiri, Chinwe would see the rising Pan-Bahianist Society of Tiwura take shape under Kelechi Iwobi-Odoh. Chinwe knew this threatened the position of foreign businesses, and it also would come to threaten his position as Iwobi-Odoh criticized the Tiwuran reaction to the Horo Rebellion and wanted to "reform" the TAF. Chinwe, along with several other commanders, would take their worries to Clearmont, but this was rejected by Clearmont as he did not see them as any threat. This began to further the rift between Chinwe and Clearmont. Chinwe also returned to the beginning of the Ntabos, street gangs that arose within Omamiri due to the increasing issue of poverty within the city and the lack of recruitment in the city's police force. Omamiri would attempt to get the TAF involved in local law enforcement, which was somewhat successful. In 1953, Chinwe would take further control over the southeast of Tiwura, meeting with more foreign businessmen and local leaders. Throughout 1953, the TAF commanders across Tiwura would begin to convene outside official meetings. The contents of these meetings were described by former TAF commander Steve Kudighe to be plans for securing TAF control in several regions of Tiwura and effectively preventing socialist rebellion which seemed to be a looming threat. Following the rise of Vudzijena Nhema in Rwizikuru and Asalewan Section of the Workers' International in Asase Lewa, Chinwe and other leaders began to believe that Tiwura needed a military ruler to prevent revolution. By September 1953, Chinwe and other leaders agreed that the TAF must keep Clearmont in power but use their power to push for stronger regulation of possible rebel groups. This would completely change in April of 1954, when Clearmont would cut 15% of military spending to focus on the NIM program. Around 20% of the 1st Army's men were now out of work, and around 15% underpaid. Chinwe and other TAF leaders would change their minds, and saw a coup as the only solution. In July of 1954, the 1st Army began to organize a coup d'etat. Chinwe utilized his position in Omamiri to his advantage, and gained the support of almost his entire command. On July 30th, 1954, Chinwe began his coup and swiftly deposed Clearmont. The 1st Army would quickly secure vital positions across the city, primarily the airport and ministry of defense. By the afternoon, he declared himself President of Tiwura.

Presidency

The first few weeks after the coup saw Chinwe securing power across Tiwura. Other military leaders across Tiwura would execute similar overthrows of local government officials who they believed would oppose the rise of Chinwe in Omamiri. During his second week, tensions rose between Chinwe and Maj. General Alec Ajayi in Isowo City, the country's second largest urban center. Ajayi would refuse to move from his post in Isowo City after Chinwe wanted to replace him with Maj. Gen Jonathan Tobechukwu. This led to a one-week long standoff between Tobechukwu and Ajayi around the city, until Ajayi eventually relented when he was offered the choice to stay and face trial or be exiled to Estmere. After about three weeks, Chinwe consolidated Tiwura entirely and was seen as the true president by many foreign powers. With heavy military influence and pressure from Chinwe, the Republic Assembly passed a Constitutional amendment that created the Council of Military Staff, which was made up of the highest ranking officers of Tiwura's military and held heavy influence in legislative matters. Known colloquially as the "Military Council", the body began as an advisory board for the president regarding military affairs. Chinwe would appoint "accessory members" to the council to serve along with the assignmed military staff members, often times being relatives and personal friends. He would also found the Tiwuran Prosperity Party in his bid to gain political legitimacy beyond his military status.

His first few years as president saw Chinwe pause the NIM program, which was mainly due to the discontent it caused for military leadership and the resources it took to manage. The primary focus of Chinwe was to prevent socialist and pan-Bahianist rebellion. Within months of becoming president, Chinwe banned the PBST and ordered the arrest of thousands of its members. Many, including Iwobi-Odoh, were eventually executed for treason. The targets for this crackdown quickly expanded to other socialist groups. The Tiwuran Section of the Workers' International was banned in 1955, and many figures who Chinwe thought had any chance of causing unrest were arrested. Due to the sheer number of arrests, many of these prisoners would either be exiled to neighboring Asase Lewa or Nahrun or were killed due to the lack of facilities to contain them.

Chinwe would also pass several infrastructure plans in many regions of Tiwura, namely the Cogoday River Delta, the Uhiohia Corridor, and Ouloumy. These actions by Chinwe saw him peak in popularity from 1954-1956, when his focus was establishing rapport with the people and securing legitimacy to his position as president. In a later interview, one of Chinwe's military leaders, Lt. Brave Mombiela, described Chinwe's earlier years as "a man who wanted nothing more than to find ways to prevent the people from overthrowing him". These plans included the rebuilding of the Isowo City-Omamiri Road that ran through Uhiohia, which Chinwe called "the heart of Tiwuran civilization". It also saw the construction of roads in the jungle of the Cogoday Delta. In 1956 Chinwe would go on a tour of the country, visiting cities in all regions of the country to boost his popularity and observe the infrastructure projects that he started. He would hold lavish parades when he visited, using them as a way to show that he improbed both Tiwuran development and military power by having thousands of soldiers participate in the events. At the end of his tour, he would announce that the National Identity Movement would be restarted.

Chinwe's NIM, however, was different. In the years leading up to this, more and more was seen in his rhetoric of Mwo supremacist ideology. Mwo was taught in schools in all regions of the country, and the Obo Empire was given a positive look in Tiwuran history courses while those of the Rukimi and Adilun went unmentioned. The program also forced more rigid segregation within the TAF. The reasons for this rise of ethnic conflict are a debate, but it is evident that Chinwe's views of other populations in Tiwura were never kind. A few weeks before his establishment of the program, he stated at a parade in Elumbidi that "the Mwo, my people, being the dominant people of my nation, deserved better than to be listed amongst those others". Advisors and other officials also would push this belief, commonly using "Gundaya" or "Non-Mwo" as descriptors for any anti-government organizations. Chinwe, along with other Tiwuran military leaders, believed that Tiwura's Gundaya were compromised into anti-Tiwuran sentiment by Asase Lewa, further fueling the rift between the Tiwuran government and the people of the north. Chinwe's personal beliefs were believed to have origins in his military experience and the ethnic divisions that were created within units that he was put in command of, both in the Royal Coast Rifles and Tiwuran Armed Forces. Another major shift that came in 1956 was the purging of "anti-Tiwuran threats" out of the Tiwuran government, which almost entirely consisted of non-Mwo officials and Irfani officials. This movement solidified the ethnic conflict, and Chinwe began to see resistance. Iwobi-Odoh would visit Port Royal following this news and called for the Gundaya to "join your revolutionary brethren to the north. Organize and be the spearhead for revolution here as well." Within weeks of the program changes and the purge, protests erupted across Gundayaland and the Midlands. Chinwe would organize a military crackdown on protests within time.

During the late 1950s, Chinwe's actions as president shifted away from building up Tiwura and towards stopping threats against it. In 1958, during the Tiwura-Obergond Border Incident, Chinwe would nearly bring Tiwura to war with Obergond. During Chinwe's initial meeting with the Military Council, the others atendees recalled him suggested an invasion of Obergond would increase Tiwura's position amongst Bahian nations and even entertained the possibility of annexing the Sotirian regions. However, Chinwe did not follow through, and called upon Estmere and Werania to mediate the conflict and bring it to an end. Following this, Chinwe's position as president began to be threatened as many of his own commanders were enraged that they did not invade. The internal balance of power that maintained Chinwe's position was being threatened, and new threat emerged in 1960 when Yemet was formed, and along with it the United Bahian Republic. Many of those close to Chinwe at the time saw a shift in demeanor and personality, namely a growing paranoia. Later that year, Chinwe was away from the capital in the Magadian city of Mara when three generals and around 150 soldiers began to make their way into Omamiri from the north. This group would fight the soldiers stationed at the capital, eventually being surrounded outside the Presidential Palace, where reinforcements were able to support the government soldiers and the coup was destroyed. This event confirmed Chinwe's paranoia, and in early 1961 Chinwe would dissolve the Military Council, fearing that if allowed coup leaders to collude more efficiently. He would also begin a wider crackdown on political enemies across Tiwura, fearing that the new UBR would threaten Tiwura's sovereignty. The last change Chinwe brought was returning the idea of an invasion of Yemet. Since the Obergond incident, Chinwe held a belief that northwestern Yemet shared more in common with Tiwura than Yemet. There was also an valuable resources located near the border, and Chinwe sought to try and revitalize the Tiwuran economy that had, for the last few years, stagnated.