Force Decimation
Force Decimation (Syaran: Присилно десеткување, Prisilno desetkuvanje) was the military doctrine of the Syaran National Army employed during the Zemplen War. Force Decimation entailed the usage of armored and mechanized forces to attack the flanks of an enemy force with the intent of surrounding and subsequently destroying the force in detail. The ultimate objection was the "decimation" of the enemy force, rendering it either annihilated or incapable of further offensive or defensive capability. Force Decimation was developed based on Syaran military history from the 1960s up until the early 2000s, and was the predominant methodology of fighting during when the Zemplen War broke out in May 2008. Force Decimation proved ineffective when fighting against the Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka, and the doctrine was scrapped following the end of the war in 2010.
Background
During the Siduri War the Army of the Syaran Republic had learned that it's slow moving firepower heavy Measured Battle Doctrine was unable to deal with the increased development of armored warfare practiced by the Common Axis powers. After the war the ARS abandoned the concept and began developing a separate doctrine centered around independent mobile armored formations much like those that had been fielded by the Cacertian Empire. This led to the abandonment of heavy tanks like the Thaumas and the adoption of the lighter and faster Myrmeke Main Battle Tank, intended to emphasis speed and mobility. For the remainder of its existence the ARS was primarily focused on low intensity conflicts with neighboring Ruvelka during the Granika Border War and the Hayren War, but in 1969 the Seven Day War involved fast moving and heavily armed Syaran forces ejecting Ruvelkan forces from Zemplen. The success of mobile armored forces, backed up by mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery, became the mainstay of Syaran offensive operations. While this was never formalized as a cohesive doctrine before the ARS dissolved during the Refusal War, the concept was revitalized following the establishment of the Syaran Commonality Armed Forces.
The focus on pincer movements became a major focal point of Syaran military exercises during the 1990s and early 2000s. The doctrine was officially formalized following the Imerti Conflict, where fast moving Syaran armored forces had repelled a Ruvelkan invasion of Imerti. The first document detailed "Force Decimation" was released in October 2005, and it was shortly thereafter established as the educational standard for Syaran officer academies.
Methodology
Force Decimation was a principally an operational-level concept, to be conducted by corps and field armies, although the implementation would fall to the division and brigade level. A standard Syaran mechanized corps of 60,000-75,000 troops would consist of two mechanized divisions, an armored division, and a reserve mechanized division (usually labeled as a motorized division). The corps would also field two brigades of artillery (field and rocket artillery), a helicopter aviation regiment, a regiment of engineers, an air defense brigade, a support brigade, an anti-tank regiment, and a reconnaissance regiment. Standard Syaran Army protocol would call for the reconnaissance regiment advancing ahead of the main body by anywhere from 5-20 kilometers depending on terrain or circumstances.
Once an enemy force of sufficient size was identified, the Syaran corps commander would deploy his divisions in a pre-battle formation that usually involved placing the armored division in the center, with the two mechanized divisions on each wing. The motorized division along with the anti-tank regiment would serve as a immediate reserve and flank guard to protect the corps as it began it's assault. The armored division, with support from the corps rocket artillery brigade would commence the attack with the intent of pinning down the enemy force in place, while the mechanized divisions on each flank would advance with the intent of probing the flanks of the enemy force to identify weak spots or gaps in their lines. Once they had been identified, the mechanized divisions would then turn "inward", and attack the flanks of the enemy in a pincer movement with fire support from the corps helicopter gunships and their own organic artillery batteries. The goal of the pincer was to link up with the other Syaran division on the other flank to complete the encirclement of the enemy force.
Once the two pincers had met in the "middle", they would then turn inward and proceed to attack the enemy force from the rear. Surrounded and under attack from all sides, it was expected that the enemy force would then either surrender or be destroyed, either way resulting in a Syaran victory. It was expected that Syaran forces would attack in quick succession and focus heavily on speed, even at the expense of tactical flexibility.
The end goal of Force Decimation was the destruction of enemy forces of equivalent size to a Syaran corps or army, allowing the Syarans to pick and choose the nature of the engagement while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Field Marshal Vakhtang Avakian likened it to "bite and chew", allowing the Syaran Army to systematically destroy an enemy force in detail. Much of Force Decimation was left to the leeway of the local commanders to decide; because of the variety of different circumstances Syaran forces could expect to operate under, it became expected that Syaran generals would be free to prosecute their attacks to their own likings and methods. However, Syaran commanders were also expected to obey the orders of their superiors and their operations once finalized. As a result there was a significant culture of both independent but robust obedience instilled in Syaran officers leading up to and during the Zemplen War, which was reflected in the course of the Syaran operations in the conflict.
Usage and shortcomings
Following the outbreak of fighting in Zemplen in May 2008, most Syaran officials and senior military commanders expected a repetition of the Imerti Conflict three years earlier. After the breakdown of negotiations in July Field Marshal Vakhtang Avakian proposed a general offensive known as Operation Aspidoon that would drive the Imperial Armed Forces of Ruvelka from the disputed regions along the border. Executive of Syara Dragomir Zhelev agreed and the offensive began on 3 August 2008. Having mobilized faster owing to the more centralized Syaran command structure, the Syarans overran Ruvelkan forces within the disputed regions and expelled Ruvelkan troops from Zemplen by 18 August.
However, Chancellor Edviná Molnár refused to back down and ordered the Ruvelkan armed forces to reform along the border and prepare to retake Ruvelka's pre-war territory. the move surprised Syaran civilian and military leadership, who had been expecting a repeat of previous Syaran-Ruvelkan conflicts. With Ruvelka mobilizing hundreds of thousands of fresh troops from the Imperial Army and Territorial Defense Forces, the prospect of a large scale Ruvelkan counter-offensive seemed inevitable. In Zovahr, Field Marshal Avakian proposed a second offensive aimed at destroying the Ruvelkan forces mobilizing along the border. This general offensive, which became known as Operation Aspis, called for three Army Groups to conduct a textbook Force Decimation operation. Army Group Alpha in the north under Field Marshal Nikodemos Cvetkov and Army Group Gamma under Field Marshal Daniel Mladenov Todorov would launch a pincer against Ruvelkan forces in the center while the Ruvelkans were held in place by an attack by Army Group Beta under Field Marshal Aleksandar Čorić.
Aspis was launched on 14 September and almost immediately ran into trouble. In the north, Army Group Alpha faced unexpectedly stiff resistance around the city of Sarud, which delayed the northern pincer. In the south Army Group Gamma faced difficulty surmounting the Ruvelkan defenses at Pannonhalma and Albertirsa. Without their flanks threatened, the Ruvelkans opposite Army Group Beta were able to more effectively resist the Syaran advance. By mid-October the Syarans had called off the offensive and declared victory. The capture of most of the Ruvelkan cities near the border however largely overshadowed the failure of Operation Aspis: despite the heavy fighting, most of the Ruvelkan army had disengaged under orders from General Áron Surány, who had the Ruvelkan army pull back from the border rather than engage in a pitched battle they were unprepared for.
Field Marshall Avakian had expected around 300,000-500,000 Ruvelkan casualties and the destruction of Ruvelka's Army Group Center, but the objective had eluded the Syarans. Furthermore, the Syarans had encountered unexpected difficulty in fighting in Ruvelka. Force Decimation required extended offensive maneuvers from Syaran forces, but these were difficult to carry out in Ruvelka for a number of reasons. To begin with, the terrain of Ruvelka was not well suited to the mass maneuvers of brigades and divisions the Syarans were hoping to conduct. Most Syaran military exercises took place in the relatively flat lands of Galania and Scitaria, but Ruvelka was dominated by large mountain ranges and expanses of thick pine forests. What flat plains existed were largely filled with built up urban areas to accommodate Ruvelka's 170 million inhabitants. As a result, large scale maneuvers were difficult to conduct amid limited open terrain, or otherwise had to be confined to large roadways and highways that were easy to target with airstrikes and artillery.
Second, Ruvelka's armies were often as large or often larger than Syaran forces, making a complete encirclement difficult. Between the sizes of the battlefields, and the limited terrain, Syaran forces were often forced to conduct their pincer movements in disjointed fashion, with battalions and brigades often unable to immediately support each other due to the distance between them. These gaps were often exploited by Ruvelkan troops, who unlike the Syarans were used to operating in rough and uneven terrain without the support of motorways and roads. Ruvelkan commanders and generals quickly learned that Syaran pincer movements were the epicenter of their operation and develop numerous counters to them. Snipers and armored forces would wait in ambush for the Syarans to advance on the flanks, which were usually dictated by existing roads and highways. Once the Syarans were committed to the maneuver, gaps often formed up in their lines of advance that would allow Ruvelkan forces to infiltrate and counter-attack threw, through Syaran units and formations into disarray, turning division and brigade level maneuvers into isolated battalion and lower level engagements where the Ruvelkans were better prepared to fight. Ruvelkan generals would often employ their helicopter gunships as rotating hit and run units, flying just above tree top level below the minimum range of some Syaran air defense systems, sweeping through with barrages of rockets and missiles targeting the leading armored columns of Syaran forces.
Even if the Syarans were able to complete the encirclement, the space and terrain that was afforded to the Ruvelkans often allowed entire regiments to sneak through Syaran lines and escape, defeating the entire purpose of the pincer movement and Force Decimation by denying the Syarans the complete destruction of the Ruvelkan units in question.
Having failed to destroy the Ruvelkan armies in Operation Aspis, Syaran leadership was largely at a loss as to how to proceed. There had been little expectation or desire for a long war, but it was clear that Debrecen would not negotiate until the Syarans withdrew to the pre-war boundaries. In the winter the Ruvelkans launched a general counter-offensive against the Syaran forces. Though it proved too ambitious for Ruvelkan capabilities, it demonstrated that the Principality would not back down. In response, Field Marshal Avakian drew up plans for a new set of offensives in the spring that would transfer more control to the Army Group Commanders, whom Avakian believed would be in a better position to plan out their attacks from their own area-of-operations.
In February 2009 the Syarans came into an unexpected windfall when Army Group Gamma, attempting to consolidate their position after the winter fighting, ended up undermining the entire disposition of Army Group South. The Ruvelkans quickly lost ground and threw a desperate counter-attack which failed, after which Colonel General Tihomir Orlić and his 10th Army were able to exploit by cutting off the city of Aszód, laying siege to it starting in on 25 February. The surprise victory, in the terrain of the Matra Mountains that it was assumed the Ruvelkans would reign supreme, convinced Syaran leadership of the ability of the Syaran National Army to defeat the Ruvelkans resoundingly.
In April the Syaran Spring Offensives began with the intent of destroying the Ruvelkan Imperial Army in its entirety. Instead of attempting to defeat the Ruvelkan Army Groups in one fell sweep, each Syaran Army Group was tasked with the destruction of their Ruvelkan opposition within their own AO. Because of the logistical limitations of supporting nearly 3.5 million men and tens of thousands of armored fighting vehicles, the offensives could not all be launched at once. Army Group Gamma in the south was the first to start, commencing Operation Sagaris on 17 April. Field Marshal Todorov, Gamma's Commanding Officer, had devised a replication of Force Decimation for his attack; 8th Army under Colonel General Emanuel Bilić and 10th Army under Colonel General Orlić would attack on the left and right flanks respectively, while 5th Army under Colonel General Kakig Torossian would pin the forces of Tibor Fehér's Army Group South in place.
In his memoirs, General Torossian was highly critical of Todorov's plan and leadership leading up to and during Operation Sagaris. Torossian highlighted a number of issues; at the foremost, the plan was exceptionally uninspired and basic, meaning the Ruvelkans would likely be expecting it. Second, Syaran forces were ill-suited to carry out the offensive as they stood. Orlić's 10th Army was sorely under-strength owing to the need to dispatch XXXV Corps under Lt. General Zaharinka Mitrovska to encircle Aszód. General Bilić was also poorly suited to lead 8th Army's offensive; not only were a portion of his forces tied up protecting the flank on the Matra Mountains, the notoriously cautious and slow moving Bilić would ensure that 8th Army's attack would be identified by the Ruvelkans with enough time for them to develop a counter. Lastly, 5th Army would be conducting an assault against the meat of Ruvelka's defenses, which Fehér had extensively developed. Todorov dismissed Torossian's complaints, and Torossian's efforts to appeal to Avakian were ignored on the basis of letting the Army Group Field Marshals handle their dispositions.
Torossian's concerns proved valid. 5th Army slammed into the Kenderes Front and was stalled within a few days. On the right flank Orlić's under-strength 10th Army was parried by the 4th Aszód Front, and 8th Army's slow advance allowed the Ruvelkans to mass anti-tank helicopter gunships, which swept across Bilić's forward divisions and decimated Syaran armor. Despite fighting on terrain that was supposed to favor the Syaran style of war, Operation Sagaris concluded with Syaran objectives out of reach, and Army Group Gamma was badly mauled.
In central Ruvelka a similar scene played out. Field Marshal Arisdages Koundakjian, having taken command of Army Group Beta earlier in the year, planned for a similar offensive, with 1st Army under Colonel General Marko Kukolja attacking from the north while 9th Army under Colonel General Valentin Stavrik attacked from the south. 6th Army under Colonel General Zlaten Danielov Velikov would hold the forces of Army Group Center under Eliska Hanáková. The plan, known as Operation Polyandreion, commenced on 20 April shortly after the start of Sagaris and pitted nearly a million Syaran troops against nearly 1.5 million Ruvelkan soldiers.
The plan ran into difficulties almost immediately. 9th Army was forced to advance along a wide berth of pine forests and foothills that slowed their advance to a crawl in the face of spirited Ruvelkan resistance. In the north, 1st Army was forced to fight at the city of Sagerejo, which quickly brought the Syaran attack to a halt. Already a defensive-minded commander illsuited to the attack, General Kukolja's plan of assault quickly became another repetition of Force Decimation, but the Syaran troops of 1st Army simply weren't enough to carry out the attack on Ruvelkan forces in and around the city. The Syarans were quickly reduced to simply shelling the city into rubble, which ended any real chance at striking against Army Group Center's right flank.
Unable to break through the city, Field Marshal Koundakjian ordered General Velikov, who's 6th Army had by comparison made good progress against Army Group Center, to dispatch reinforcements to support 1st Army. This came in the form of XI Corps under Lt. General Yorgos Gorceski, who successfully broke through Ruvelkan defenses south of the city. The commitment of XI Corps however had been expected by Vice Field Marshal Hanáková who ordered her forces to counter-attack against the overstretched forces of 6th and 9th Armies, forcing General Stavrik's 9th Army on the defensive. Instead of consolidating their gains and pressing on as Field Marshal Koundakjian desired, Army Group Beta was forced to stave off a collapse of their southern flank along 9th Army's positions.
In northern Syara however Field Marshal Nikodemos Cvetkov, in command of Army Group Alpha, had recognized the shortcomings of Force Decimation the previous year when his forces had struggled to break though Ruvelkan lines during Operation Aspis. In a message to Field Marshal Vakhtang Avakian in 28 December, 2008 he highlighted his suspicions about Syaran doctrinal abilities against Ruvelkan forces. He called into question the "ability to form a cohesive encirclement" against an enemy force "adept at melting into the terrain and exploiting the formation boundaries that inevitably form along extended lines of engagement". Recognizing that Ruvelkan forces were simply too numerous to successfully encircle without leaving gaps that could be exploited for counter-strokes and withdrawals, Cvetkov instead opted to direct Army Group Alpha's focus away from the destruction of Army Group North towards seizing strategic targets.
Operation Harpe did away with two major pincer movements. Instead, Cvetkov's plan called for a two major feints by 2nd Army under Colonel General Vedran Kučina against Ruvelkan forces in and around Kaposvár, while 3rd Army under Colonel General Vladislav Ivov Kochanov would attack Kunhegyes. Once the Ruvelkans had identified these attacks and dispatched reserves to stop them, 7th Army under Colonel General Simeon Karandzhulov would launch an assault against the weakened Ruvelkan center. Instead of swinging north or south to complete the encirclement of Ruvelkan forces in either Kaposvár or Kunhegyes, 7th Army would instead advance eastward at all costs to seize the port city of Mátészalka. Capturing the strategic port would accomplish two goals; first, it would cut off Ruvelka's last remaining major sea port from foreign trade, especially the flow of arms and fuel from allied Acrea. Second, it would provide an anchor for which Syaran forces could pivot north of the Kurillas Mountains, bypassing the most treacherous and rugged terrain of Ruvelka and threatening to pour into eastern Ruvelka. Unable to be resupplied at sea and with their primary defense line now circumnavigated, Cvetkov believed Debrecen would have no choice but to sue for peace.
On 16 May 2009 Army Group Alpha launched Operation Harpe, with 2nd Army and 3rd Army attacking Ruvelkan forces along the North Koryal Plain. Having expected a repeat of the previous two Syaran offensives further south, Vice Field Marshal Péter Novák had positioned his reserves to block such a move. As a result, the Ruvelkans were caught off guard when Karandzhulov's 7th Army launched its assault against the now depleted Ruvelkan center, which was ruptured by 21 May. Instead of turning norths or south as expected, 7th Army continued pushing east, brushing aside the remnants of the 7th Mátészalka Front. The alarming development triggered concern within the Imperial General Staff and Chief of Staff Surány, who recognized the threat to Mátészalka.
To reach Mátészalka required passage through the city of Soltvadkert, either directly through the main road or bypassing north of it. Vice field Marshal Novák recognized the vitality of the city and decided to try to force an engagement within the city, where the Ruvelkans would have a better defensive position to resist 7th Army. To bait Karandzhulov to attacking through Soltvadkert, Novák deliberately moved four of his divisions out of their positions near the city and into the wooded hills north, in an effort to make the Soltvadkert seem more undefended. The deception worked, and after his reconnaissance regiments confirmed that Soltvadkert was manned by only a few divisions Karandzhulov ordered 7th Army to assault through the city and push on eastward.
At the Battle of Soltvadkert (30 May - 13 June) General Karandzhulov attempted to resolve the engagement with the implementation of Force Decimation, a pincer with I Corps in the north and II Corps in the south while IX Corps pushed into the city. In the south II Corps won a major armored battle, but IX Corps struggled to break through Ruvelkan defenses in the city itself. North of the city, I Corps was thrown back by the infantry divisions Novák had previously dispersed. Forced to disengage, Karandzhulov wanted to press the attack by Field Marshal Cvetkov had grown wary of the large gap between 7th Army and the now over-extended 2nd and 3rd Armies. Over objections by Karandzhulov, 7th Army was forced to pull back west with the rest of Army Group Alpha.
Army Group Alpha proceeded to capture both Kaposvár and Kunhegyes, but ultimately the operation fell short of Cvetkov's goals. The failure to capture Soltvadkert made any push on Mátészalka unattainable, and while the Syarans had inflicted heavy losses on the Ruvelkans, the reversal was also true. The Ruvelkan Autumn Counter-Offensive would commence in September and reverse many of the gains made by the Syarans, eliminating the immediate threats posed to Soltvadkert. The two major offensives between the spring and autumn had inflicted heavy casualties on the Syarans, amounting to over 500,000 men killed or wounded. Furthermore, the offensives had thoroughly demonstrated the shortcomings of Force Decimation and its limitations against the Ruvelkan armies.
Revisions and abandonment
Suspicions about the validity of Force Decimation had been raised as early as Autumn 2008 following the failure of Operation Aspis. The failures of the Syaran Spring Offensives and the heavy casualties suffering over the course of 2009 further added weight to the arugment that the Syaran method of war was ineffective towards combatting the Ruvelkan Imperial Army.
Over the course of winter 2009-2010 various potential solutions and revisions of Force Decimation were floated and implemented. A major point of discussion was the transferring of more autonomous decision making to brigade and battalion level commanders. The increased focus on tactical level formations had been ongoing throughout much of 2009 in response to the high levels of fluidity and autonomy with the Ruvelkan forces and the need for Syaran forces to operate effectively without division and corps level support.
My mid-2009 Syaran forces were operating with increased focus on what became known as tactical combat groupings, battalion sized formations supported by attached components of armor, artillery, air defense, and engineering sections. This development had largely been ad hoc and a forced reaction to the proliferation of infiltration tactics by Ruvelkan formations. This had shifted much combat power away from division commanders towards lower level tactical formations.
With major offensive operations suspended due to the heavy losses suffering during 2009, there was still a question of strategic priority. In late January 2010 the Syaran Army Group commanders were summoned to a meeting in Zovahr. Defense Minister Vitanov, based on suggestions from Field Marshal Cvetkov, desired to switch Syaran combat operations away from the destruction of Ruvelkan forces in the field and towards the capture of strategic targets. The abandonment of Force Decimation was to be complete with Operation Titanomachy, but the war ended before it could be implemented.